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THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION CASE:
REMEMBERING SAFE HARBOR DAY
Gary C. Leedes*
"The circumstances of [the 2000 presidential] election call to mind
a quote from football coaching legend Vince Lombardi: 'We didn't
lose the game, we just ran out of time.'"'
I. BEYOND THE PoINT OF No RETURN
A. Focal Points of this Article
The 2000 presidential election transported the nation down a
long and winding road without a map and headed in an uncertain
direction. While it might be an exaggeration to say that the sys-
tem of constitutional law was self-destructing, it is undoubtedly
true that the events surrounding the election were spinning out
of control, and that irreparable harm to the electoral process and
thereby the nation was imminent.
* Professor of Law, Emeritus, University of Richmond School of Law; B.S.E., 1960,
University of Pennsylvania; LL.B., 1962, Temple Law School; LL.M., 1973, Harvard Law
School; S.J.D., 1984, Harvard Law School. The author wishes to thank his law clerks Alex
Stagliano, a student at the University of Wyoming School of Law and Chris Ashby, a stu-
dent at the University of Richmond School of Law for their outstanding work in getting
this article in shape. The author also appreciates the comments, questions, criticisms, and
other helpful responses from The Honorable Richard A. Posner, Don Rubottom, Bruce
Ackerman, Azizah al-Hibri, Michael Dorf, Garrett Epps, Charles Fried, Einer Elhauge,
Douglas Laycock, Sandy Levinson, John Pagan, Michael Perry, Stephan Saltzburg, Rod-
ney Smolla, and William Van Alstyne. The author also thanks Frank Atkinson and Rich-
ard Cullen of McGuireWoods LLP, as well as Fielding Douthat and the staff of the Univer-
sity of Richmond Law Review for their assistance in putting this article together.
1. Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1273 (Fla. 2000) (Harding, J., dissenting) [herein-
after Harris 11, rev'd and remanded sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000) (per cu-
riam) [hereinafter Bush Ill.
2. Contingency plans were made to have Florida Governor Jeb Bush avoid any proc-
ess that might have been issued by the Florida Supreme Court that would have interfered
with the slate of electors that the court was going to appoint. E-mail from Donald Rubot-
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The presidential race was dubbed "the loony election."3 It cer-
tainly was unpredictable, bizarre, and flawed. Many of the mis-
haps were due to complications caused by the electoral college,4
which was designed to lend legitimacy to a President who won or
lost the popular election indecisively.' The college's imprimatur
usually produces an aura of legitimacy because most elections
produce "a clear cut majority of electoral votes."6 If no presiden-
tial candidate obtains a majority of electoral college votes, Con-
gress selects the President and Vice President of the United
States.' The Framers chose Congress as the tiebreaker because
Congress represents the will of the people. In 2000, the voting
public was divided almost evenly, and the popular vote in the de-
cisive state, Florida, was a statistical tie.8 Under these circum-
stances, at some point finality rather than a 100% accurate vote
count becomes a necessity.
An impartial umpire applying the rule of law is desirable, if not
indispensable, in an election in which the margin of error in
counting votes is greater than the margin of victory. The Su-
preme Court accepted the challenge to serve as umpire, and the
crisis that was simmering subsided soon after the Court rendered
its decision.9 The Court could be given credit for making a wise
decision in an unusually stressful situation; however, a large
tom, Aide & Legal Advisor to Tom Feeney, Speaker of the Florida House of Representa-
tives, to Gary C. Leedes, Professor of Law, Emeritus, University of Richmond School of
Law (Mar. 3, 2001, 11:16:44 EST) (on file with the author). The Florida legislature was
planning to convene throughout the day and night on the day that electors met in order to
protect the electors from arrest. Id. An adjutant who lived in Georgia and who was not
subject to service of process by the Florida courts would be instructed to deliver personally
the electoral votes (and requisite certificates) to appropriate officials in Washington, D.C.
See E-mail from Donald Rubottom, Aide & Legal Advisor to Tom Feeney, Speaker of the
Florida House of Representatives, to Gary C. Leedes, Professor of Law, Emeritus, Univer-
sity of Richmond School of Law (Feb. 7, 2001, 19:11:37 EST) (on file with the author). To
my knowledge, this information was not reported to the media resulting in many law pro-
fessors taking a "What Me Worry" approach to the imminent, irreparable harm on Decem-
ber 12, 2000.
3. The Loony Election, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKs, Dec. 21, 2000, at 96.
4. For a discussion of some of the potential problems, see infra notes 98-124 and ac-
companying text.
5. See ROBERT M. HARDAWAY, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE AND THE CONSTITUTION
127-28 (1994) (discussing "close" elections and the effect of the electoral college).
6. Id. at 21.
7. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII. The electoral college vote is indecisive when no can-
didate in the presidential race has a majority of the electors appointed to vote.
8. See Bush II, 121 S. Ct. at 527-28.
9. See id. at 533 (ending the manual recount in Florida).
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number of learned observers have criticized it as biased.10 Un-
doubtedly, historians will reconstruct the events, the psychology,
and the dangers that would have been encountered had the Court
not acted as it did. The extent of the danger to the nation that
was prevented by the Court's decision will then be assessed from
a longer range and, perhaps, more objective perspective. None-
theless, it is not too early to begin to put events into place.
When the polls closed on November 7, 2000, no one knew who
would become the President-elect. George W. Bush ("Bush") had
fewer popular votes nation-wide than Albert Gore, Jr. ("Gore"),
but the winner of the nation's presidential election hinged upon
the contested outcome in Florida.1 Even after the recount was
completed, which candidate was entitled to Florida's twenty-five
electors remained uncertain. 2 One question was whether the
votes of Florida's electors would be accepted by both Houses of
Congress, and that question depended, in part, on whether the is-
sues in Gore v. Harris"3 (Harris II) were determined before mid-
night on December 12, 2000, which is referred to in this article as
"Safe Harbor Day." If the Florida recount had continued after
midnight on Safe Harbor Day, then Congress would have had an
active role to play on January 6, 2001. Congress may either count
or reject the votes of a state's electors." This is especially impor-
tant when there is a controversy between a state's supreme court
and the other branches of its government regarding the lawful-
ness of the electors' votes. 5
In Florida, there was intractable disagreement between the
State's supreme court and the State's legislative and executive
10. E.g., The Election Mess, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKs, Feb. 8,2001, at 48.
11. The first major decision in the disputed election came when the Florida Supreme
Court extended the deadline for counties submitting late and amended election returns
from November 14, to November 26. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772
So. 2d 1220, 1240 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam) [hereinafter Harris 11, vacated and remanded
sub. nom. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 121 S. Ct. 471 (2000) (per curiam)
[hereinafter Bush 1], on remand at 772 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam) [hereinafter
Harris III] (clarifying the holding in Harris 1).
12. Many voters think they vote for the presidential candidates identified on the bal-
lot, but voters actually cast ballots for electors. In Florida, the electors' names were not
listed on the presidential ballot in the 2000 election. See CNN.com-Electors, Frequently
Asked Questions, at http'/www.cnn.com/interactive/allpoliticsl0012/electors/print.html
(last visited Mar. 13, 2001).
13. 772 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
14. See 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
15. See id.
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branches. 6 Thus, had the Supreme Court not stepped in and pre-
served the safe harbor, thereby conclusively protecting the slate
of Republican-appointed electors certified by the Governor on No-
vember 26,'" Congress would have had the duty on January 6 of
determining whether the Florida legislature could validly appoint
a second set of Bush electors.'"
Congress undertook this very task in 1877."9 In that debacle,
the Twelfth Amendment failed to operate in accordance with the
Framers' intent, resulting in Congress's choice for President,
Rutherford B. Hayes, being regarded as an illegitimate Presi-
dent.20 In 1877, Democrats took up the cry, "Tilden or War," and
threatened to march on the Capitol.2' It was feared that a similar,
or at least analogous, situation would disrupt the orderly transi-
tion of administrations on Inauguration Day, January 20.
In 2000, the recount did not continue after midnight on Safe
Harbor Day; thus, Congress had no active role to play. Instead,
Congress routinely counted Florida's twenty-five electoral votes
and verified that the outcome was in Bush's favor.22 These
twenty-five votes gave Bush one vote more than the majority re-
quired by the Twelfth Amendment.23 No objections were debated
16. See infra Part I.B.1.
17. R.W. Apple, Jr., A Mantle of Legitimacy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2000, at Al (dis-
cussing the November 26 certification).
18. Compare 3 U.S.C. § 2 (1994) (providing state legislators with the power to appoint
electors if a state "has failed to make a choice on the day prescribed by law"), with 3 U.S.C.
§ 15 (1994) (outlining the responsibilities of Congress when a state presents more than one
slate of electors).
19. See SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE 734
(1965).
20. See id.; HARDAWAY, supra note 5, at 135-36.
21. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: 1863-1877, at 576 (1988).
22. Edward Walsh & Juliet Eilperin, Gore Presides As Congress Tallies Votes Electing
Bush; Black Caucus Members Object As Fla. Numbers Are Accepted, WASH. POST, Jan. 7,
2001, at Al.
23. U.S. CONST. amend. XII ("The person having the greatest number of votes for
President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of
Electors appointed....").
The commands of the Twelfth Amendment, however, are not as clear as they might ap-
pear. For example, Robert M. Hardaway has stated:
With regard to actual procedures, the Twelfth Amendment leaves many ques-
tions unanswered. For example, it fails to indicate whether the president is to
be chosen by legislators sitting in the House of Representatives at the time of
the presidential election, or the incoming members of the House to be sworn
in the following January.
HARDAWAY, supra note 5, at 2. Others have stated:
[The Twelfth Amendment], which supersedes clause 3 of § 1 of Article II,
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on January 6 in the Joint Session of Congress due to the conclu-
sive presumption set forth in the counting rule, 3 U.S.C. § 5, es-
tablished by Congress in 1887.24 Section 5 denied Congress the
power to reject Florida's electoral votes, but only because the Su-
preme Court made sure that the controversy over the appoint-
ment of Florida's electors was determined before the midnight
deadline. Therefore, pursuant to 3 U.S.C. § 5, which explains that
a state's electoral votes "shall be conclusive, and shall govern in
the counting of electoral votes,"2 5 Florida's twenty-five votes were
counted.
The procedures for counting electoral votes in Congress would
have been quite different on January 6 if the recount had been
resumed on December 13, as 3 U.S.C. § 5 would no longer have
required Congress to count the votes of Florida's electors.2 1 This
odd system of counting electoral votes endures because of the ten-
sion between Article II of the Constitution and the Twelfth
Amendment.
was adopted so as to make impossible the situation occurring after the elec-
tion of 1800 in which Jefferson and Burr received tie votes in the electoral
college, thus throwing the selection of a President into the House of Repre-
sentatives, despite the fact that the electors had intended Jefferson to be
President and Burr to be Vice-President.
THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 1286 (1973) (internal
citations omitted).
24. See Walsh & Eilperin, supra note 22, at Al.
25. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994). This section entitled "Determination of controversy as to ap-
pointment of electors" provides:
If any State shall have provided, by laws enacted prior to the day fixed for the
appointment of the electors, for its final determination of any controversy or
contest concerning the appointment of all or any of the electors of such State,
by judicial or other methods or procedures, and such determination shall
have been made at least six days before the time fixed for the meeting of the
electors, such determination made pursuant to such law so existing on said
day, and made at least six days prior to said time of meeting of the electors,
shall be conclusive, and shall govern in the counting of the electoral votes as
provided in the Constitution, and as hereinafter regulated, so far as the as-
certainment of the electors appointed by such State is concerned.
Id.
In other words, Congress was required to count the votes of Florida's electors because
the State complied with the following conditions: Its applicable election laws (1) were en-
acted prior to the day fixed for the popular election (November 7), (2) provided for the
State's "final determination" of any controversy by the judiciary or another branch of gov-
ernment, and (3) the final determination of the election controversy occurred no later than
December 12. See id.
26. Id. If3 U.S.C. § 5 no longer applied, then 3 U.S.C. § 15 would have been applicable
when Congress counted the votes. See 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
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On the one hand, Article II grants to state legislatures the
power to appoint electors.2 ' All state legislatures currently dele-
gate to the people the legislative power to appoint electors.' The
people's selection is then made in the popular election. The legis-
lature's delegation to the people to appoint electors, however, is
revocable, even after the citizens have voted.29 On the other hand,
the Twelfth Amendment grants Congress the power to count the
votes of the electors appointed by the state legislature or its dele-
gate.30
The power to count votes is the power to reject them. Therefore,
the body (that is, Congress) that counts votes cast by a state's
electors has the final say concerning their legality, unless the Su-
preme Court intervenes before Congress has the opportunity to
debate the issue. In Bush v. Gore3 (Bush IT), the Court did inter-
vene, and its decision safeguarded the conclusive presumption
described in 3 U.S.C. § 5. Had the Court not acted when it did,
the Florida legislature would have appointed a new slate of elec-
tors in a desperate, last minute attempt to overcome the loss of
the safe harbor benefit.32 The state legislature's entry would have
complicated enormously the process of counting electoral votes on
January 6, particularly if Gore had managed to squeak ahead of
Bush in the manual recount. If Florida's electors (certified previ-
ously by the Governor on November 26) lost their safe harbor
guarantee, it is unknown what weight, if any, Congress would
have given to the Governor's certification.33
27. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 ("Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Sena-
tors and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress; but no Sena-
tor or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United
States, shall be appointed an Elector.").
28. HARDAWAY, supra note 5, at 46.
29. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2; 3 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
31. 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000) (per curiam).
32. See Dexter Filkins & Dana Canedy, Committees Approve Resolutions Allowing
Florida Lawmakers to Name Electors, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2000, at A17.
33. Laurence Tribe's brief filed on Gore's behalf in the Supreme Court argued that
"SECTION 5 IS A SAFE HARBOR OPTION, NOT A MANDATE." Brief of Respondents Al
Gore, Jr. and Florida Democratic Party at 22, Bush I, 121 S. Ct. 471 (2000) (No. 00-836).
Tribe was trying to assure the Court that 3 U.S.C. § 15 would give the electors adequate
protection. Id. According to Bush's attorneys, the problem with Tribe's statement was that
the Florida legislature intended to take advantage of the conclusive presumption provided
by Congress, and their intent was frustrated twice by the Florida Supreme Court. Brief for
Petitioners at 35, Bush II, 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000) (No. 00-949). Theodore Olsen, counsel of
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The Court's decision, of course, avoided delay, confusion, and a
potentially disorderly joint session on January 6. Indeed, if the
Court had not intervened, and if Congress had rejected Florida's
electors, Congress might have been required to select the Presi-
dent and Vice President, thereby disenfranchising all voters who
cast their ballots on Election Day. 4
The Supreme Court's decision eliminated that contingency.
First, in a seven-to-two decision, the Court concluded that the
manual recount procedures authorized by Harris II violated the
Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Second, in a five-to-four decision, the Court pre-
vented the resumption of manual recounts that had been previ-
ously interrupted by its stay issued on December 9.36
In Bush II, the Court held that a continuation of the recount
improperly interfered with "the Florida Legislature['s] inten[tion]
to obtain the safe harbor benefits of 3 U.S.C. § 5.""3 "That stat-
ute," stated the Court, "requires that any controversy or contest
that is designed to lead to a conclusive selection of electors be
completed by December 12. That date is upon us ....
The Court's definitive decision surprised many people. Many
Court watchers predicted that if the Chief Justice could not
achieve a consensus, then the Court would not make a move that
rendered it vulnerable to attacks on its impartiality and credibil-
ity.39 The Court's holding was attacked viciously by observers who
were more than just muckrakers and iconoclasts. Four-hundred-
fifty preeminent historians and Ronald Dworkin, a widely re-
spected professor of law, published letters in the New York Re-
view of Books claiming that the five Justice majority acted to pro-
record for Bush, argued successfiully in Bush II that "[slection 5 ... creates a compact be-
tween States and Congress. By enacting laws prior to election day that seek to resolve...
contests concerning presidential electors... the Florida Legislature sought to obtain for
the State of Florida and its voters the protections that § 5 affords." Id. at 34.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XII; see also supra note 7 and accompanying text; infra text
accompanying notes 107-26.
35. Bush II, 121S. Ct. at 532.
36. Id. at 533.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Cf. Charles Krauthammer, The Winner in Bush v. Gore?, TIME, Dec. 18, 2000, at
104 ("Rehnquist does not like 5-4 in questions of this magnitude."). ,
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tect its "political position" from future erosion by eliminating the
possibility that more liberal Justices might be appointed by
Gore.40
There is, however, a qualitative difference between the histori-
ans' indictment and the frequently heard inanity that a judge's
decision is sometimes ideologically driven. Nonetheless, this tired
platitude does contain some semblance of truth. Judges do have
(or should have) firmly held values and convictions (pejoratively
called ideology) that help them make decisions. 4' Among an un-
dogmatic judge's values may be the desire to depart from foolish
consistency in a hard case, and he may "adopt an approach that is
practical and instrumental"42 if it is necessary to render a useful
decision that prevents an acute Constitutional crisis. The histori-
ans' denunciation of the Justice's motivation, however, speaks of
something more stigmatizing than a promotion of values or util-
ity. If taken seriously, the historians' assertions justify a congres-
sional investigation because the ascription of nefarious motives
40. The Election Mess, supra note 10, at 48. The historians stated:
[I]n an act no less reprehensible than the partisan resolution of the election of
1876, a narrow majority of the Supreme Court has pulled the nation back-
ward. Its decision to halt the full and accurate counting of Florida's legal
votes prevents the American people from selecting the next President of the
United States.
The narrow majority has simultaneously cast doubt upon its own motives
and undermined the legitimacy of the next chief executive. There is, justifia-
bly, a widespread impression that this narrow majority acted as it did in or-
der to install a Republican president and to expand its political position on
the Court.
Id.
Professor Ronald Dworkin's innuendoes, also published in the New York Review of
Books, planted the idea that the agenda of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia
and Thomas "includes finally abolishing abortion rights .... " Ronald Dworkin, A Badly
Flawed Election, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Jan. 11, 2001, at 53. Dworkin asserts that "[tihe
prospects of future success for the conservatives' radical program crucially depend on the
Court appointments that the new president will almost certainly make." Id. He adds, "the
troubling question.., being asked among scholars and commentators [is] whether the
Coures decision would have been different if it was Bush, not Gore, who needed the re-
count to win.. . ." Id. A sizable number of law professors agree with Dworkin's views. See,
e.g., Adam Cohen, Can the Court Recover?, TIME, Jan. 1, 2001, at 76.
41. As Justice Holmes once wrote, a judge without principles and firm convictions re-
garding the constraints of the Constitution will "quite agree that a law should be called
good if it reflects the will of the dominant forces in the community, even if it will take us to
hell." HOLMES & FRANKFURTER: THEiR CORRESPONDENCE, 1912-1934, at 19 (Robert M.
Mennel & Christine L. Compston eds., 1996).
42. RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 4 (1995).
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and unscrupulous behavior is an impeachable offense.43
Notwithstanding their impressive credentials, the historians
presumably lack expertise in mind reading. Their competence,
both as individuals and collectively, to discern an ulterior motive
is no better or worse than any other group of 450 people. Moreo-
ver, the historians' instant analysis of Article II and a compli-
cated set of federal statutes designed to work in coordination with
a complicated set of state statutes suggests that they did not do
their homework. This article argues, in part, that the historians
failed to grasp or remember the legal, political, and historical sig-
nificance of Safe Harbor Day.
The Court's opinion in Bush II is not a masterpiece; however, a
flawless and more comprehensive disquisition on the intricate
relationship between state, federal, and constitutional law was
not practicable given the expedited proceedings and time con-
straints surrounding the election. Nevertheless, and despite its
flaws, the per curiam opinion is a fair and balanced assessment of
the applicable law. Moreover, Chief Justice Rehnquist's concur-
rence, although more far-reaching, 4' is also a fair reading of Arti-
cle II and in line with precedent.45
No credible evidence suggests that any Justice's preference for
a particular candidate motivated his or her decision to prevent
the resumption of the recount under a revised set of procedures.
There are, however, sufficient grounds to believe that a resump-
43. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ('The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour .... ").
44. Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence is more far-reaching because it concludes
that the Florida Supreme Court impermissibly changed state law in violation of Article II
of the Constitution. See Bush II, 121 S. Ct. 525, 537-38 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concur-
ring). Nonetheless, Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurrence actually narrows the scope and
future applicability of the per curiam holding, since the Chief Justice went out of his way
to indicate that presidential elections are special. Id. at 533. Thus, it can be argued that in
future cases a majority of the Justices do not intend to apply the equal protection princi-
ples identified in Bush II to every instance of disparate treatment of voters by a state.
45. A unanimous Court held more than a century ago that Article I, Section 1, Clause
2, the provision in the Constitution relied upon by the concurring opinion, "operat[es] as a
limitation upon the state in respect of any attempt to circumscribe the legislative power"
to appoint electors. McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 25 (1892). In McPherson, the Court
referred to the legislature's power to appoint electors as "plenary." Id. It went on to say
that the "whole subject is committed" to the state legislature. Id. at 26. The Court added
that "[t]his power is conferred upon the legislatures of the States by the Constitution of
the United States, and cannot be taken from them or modified by their State constitu-
tions...." Id. at 35. Arguably, no other branch of the state government may interfere
with the legislature's power to appoint electors.
2001]
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tion of the recount risked irreparable harm to voters, the State of
Florida, and the congressional/state legislative balance struck by
the Constitution's provisions relating to presidential elections.46
Given these circumstances, the Court's motivation to act
promptly and definitively was based on necessity, rather than on
Machiavellian calculations concerning future appointees that
may or may not replace the individual Justices on the bench.
The Court made its motivation, the prevention of irreparable
harm, plain when it issued a stay on December 9.47 Evidence of
irreparable harm is presented throughout this article. By con-
trast, the historians present no evidence or analysis of applicable
statutes and cases, instead offering only foot-stomping asser-
tions.4 Under the unique circumstances created by the 2000 elec-
tion, it is scandal mongering to assert that the Court's opinions in
Bush II camouflage dishonorable motives. This article analyzes
46. Bruce Ackerman referred to "pessimists" who worried about "hordes of right and
left-wing extremists marching on Washington, congressional elites deadlocked, and the
situation spinning out of control." Bruce Ackerman, Anatomy of a Coup, LONDON REV. OF
BooKs, Feb. 8, 2001, at 5-6. His proposed solution was for the Court to "take[ ] care of all
the serious difficulties by enjoining Jeb Bush not to send this slate [appointed by the leg-
islature] to Congress." Id. at 6. Just how the Court would manage to obtain jurisdiction,
however, is not made clear.
47. Cf. Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 512, 512 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("The counting
of votes that are of questionable legality does ... threaten irreparable harm to the peti-
tioner, and to the country .... ").
The Emergency Application for a Stay alleged that the decisions in Harris I and Harris
II threw the results of the presidential election into intense turmoil and controversy, and
that a stay was necessary in order to "protect the integrity of the electoral process for
President and Vice President of the United States and in order to correct the serious con-
stitutional errors made by the Florida Supreme Court." Emergency Application for a Stay
of Enforcement of the Judgment Below Pending the Filing and Disposition of a Petition for
a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida at 2-3, Bush II, 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000)
(No. 00-949) (stating that a Stay was necessary "to prevent the irreparable harm" that
would be caused to Bush, Richard Cheney, the electoral process, and the Nation if the
Court did not protect the safe harbor that the Florida legislature intended to have for its
certified slate of electors). The Petitioners averred:
The Florida Supreme Court's decision raises a reasonable possibility that the
November 26 certification of Governor Bush as the winner of Florida's elec-
toral votes will be called in doubt-or purport to be withdrawn-at a time
when the December 12 deadline for naming Florida's electors could preclude
Applicants' ability to seek meaningful review by this Court.
Failure to resolve a controversy or contest concerning the appointment of
presidential electors pursuant to the law as enacted prior to election day will
jeopardize the 'conclusive' effect of any such determination for Congress
counting purposes.
Id. at 39-40 (internal citation omitted).
48. See The Election Mess, supra note 10, at 48.
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the opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court and the Florida Supreme
Court in considerable detail.49 After due deliberation, this author
contends that the Court acted responsibly, under stressful condi-
tions, in deciding a difficult case.
This article has two focal points. It presents evidence and
analysis of applicable statutes and cases to support its argument
that the decision in Bush II is defensible. The per curiam opinion
is a terse but straightforward march to the bottom line: "It's too
late to retool the system. Stop counting!" This article also argues
that attacks on the motives of the Justices are scurrilous. Preven-
tion of clear and present dangers to our system of constitutional
law is the only credible extralegal reason for the mandate that
stopped the clock from running beyond the safe harbor deadline.
B. Approaching the Brink of a Crisis
Republicans wanted finality, as quickly as possible. "Don't
change the rules of the game after you have lost" was the Repub-
lican Party's mantra, but the questions begged were: what are the
rules in the applicable state statutes, and do they prohibit the
methods and timing of the court-ordered manual recount? Demo-
crats were geared to battle for an indefinite period of time. Party
regulars chanted: "We want accuracy in counting," neglecting to
mention that the inaccurately punched ballots were cast by voters
who failed to follow instructions.
A recurring issue involved the counting of "undervotes" and
"overvotes."50 Democrats argued that counting teams should at-
49. See infra Part II.
50. E.g., Bush II, 121 S. Ct. at 531; Harris II, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1264 n.26 (2000) (per
curiam).
An undervote, in counties using punch card voting machines, is a ballot that is incom-
pletely perforated by the stylus used to punch a clean hole in a card. See Brooks Jackson,
Factcheck: Examining Florida's 'undervote, at http'//www.cnn.com/2000/ALLPOLITICS/
stories/11/30/jackson.undervotelindex.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2001). In order to make a
voter's intent detectable by a machine based on punch card technology, the voter must not
leave bits of paper ("chads") hanging in the place where there should be complete penetra-
tion. If a hole is not cleanly punched in the card, then there is a substantial likelihood that
the machine will not tabulate the vote. See David Whitman, Chadology 101: Divining a
Dimple, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 27, 2001, at 34; see also Harris II, 772 So. 2d at
1258-59.
An overvote is one in which the ballot indicates that more than one vote has been cast.
See Jurist: The Legal Education Network, Presidential Election Law: The Recount, avail-
able at http://www.jurist.law.pitt.edu/election/election2000-Oa.htm (last visited Apr. 20,
2001). The Florida Supreme Court was not concerned with counting overvotes for reasons
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tempt to discern the intent of the voter from hanging, dimpled,
and pregnant chads or from some other mark or hole.5' Republi-
cans claimed, inter alia, that counting teams lacked the compe-
tence to divine the clear intent of the voter from such circumstan-
tial evidence, and that the Florida Election Code did not even
authorize the attempt.52
The proper technique for visually examining chads is ordinarily
a mundane matter that does not agitate the entire country.53 In
local and statewide elections, a chad fight is not usually a major
news story; however, in this extremely close presidential election,
the world watched to see how the United States would resolve an
election dispute between two leading presidential candidates who
both claimed victory.
it never explained, and the court's lack of concern presented Equal Protection Clause
problems. See Harris II, 772 So. 2d at 1264 n.26 (Wells, C.J., dissenting); see also Dan
Keating, Fla. 'Overvotes' Hit Democrats the Hardest, WASH. POST., Jan. 27, 2001, at Al.
51. Cf. Brief of Respondent Albert Gore, Jr. at 46, Bush Ii, 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000) (No.
00-949) ("[W]ith respect to the counting of punch card ballots, most states do not attempt
specifically to define what particular appearance of the ballot is required before a vote is
counted.").
"Bruce Rogow, an attorney for Florida's election supervisors, [and a professor of law at
Nova University] explained with a straight face, 'Pregnancy does not count in Palm Beach
County, only penetration.'" William Safire, The Way We Live Now: 12-10-00: On Language;
Chad, N.Y. TiMES, Dec. 10, 2000, at 68.
52. Brief for Petitioners at 49, Bush II, 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000) (No. 00-949) ("The
[Florida Supreme Court] returns the case to the circuit court for this partial recount of
undervotes on the basis of unknown, or at best, ambiguous standards with authority to
obtain help from others, the credentials, qualifications, and objectivity of whom are totally
unknown") (quoting Harris II, 772 So. 2d at 1263 (Wells, C.J., dissenting)); id. at 36
("Nothing in the Florida Election Code provides for the procedure and results mandated by
the Florida Supreme Court....").
53. A chad is a tiny piece of paper that pops off a voting card after a voter has
punched through it before inserting it into a punch card voting machine. See Deborah Za-
barenko, A Chad Is Born: Debuting in 1890, It Stuck Around, WASH. POST, Nov. 24, 2000,
at A41. The chad is supposed to separate completely from the card; however, in some
Florida counties, the inspectors who examined the erroneously cast ballots considered the
imperfectly (and often improperly) punched card to be a legal vote if two or more corners of
the chad were broken or separated from the voting card. Cf. Bush II, 121 S. Ct. at 531.
Some counting teams considered the separation of one corner a vote, and still others con-
sidered a depression or an indentation (so-called dimple) or any other mark as an indica-
tion of a voter's intent. Id.
The marks (evidence of voter intent) on a punch card include dimpled chads (bulging
but not pierced), pregnant chads (attached by all four corners to a ballot that is either
bulging or pierced), hanging chads (attached by a single corner), swinging chads (attached
by two corners) and tri-chads (attached by three corners). Jurist: The Legal Education
Network, supra note 50.
Because there were no specific standards in Florida that prevented different counties
from using different methods of counting, the Supreme Court, given the need to have an
immediate final determination of the dispute, found that the equal protection and due pro-
cess problems of the counting procedures were insurmountable, Bush II, 121 S. Ct.
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The Florida Supreme Court left it up to each county to choose
its own method for discerning the clear intent of the voter,54 pre-
senting the question of whether this was a violation of the Equal
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Constitution." Was
this a question for Congress? On December 12, many observers
answered this question in the affirmative;56 however, the world
would have to wait three-and-a-half more weeks for Congress's
answer.
If Congress, rather than the Court, had decided whether Flor-
ida's system of counting undervotes was lawful, the resultant
partisan wrangling would not have been based on the rule of law.
There are feisty members in Congress who would have used any
means necessary to obtain the presidency for their party's candi-
date. Irrational exuberance by such a band of zealots could have
set in motion a chain of events that would have destabilized the
government, as occurred in 1877.17 At that time, when Congres-
sional Democrats compromised and allowed a Republican to move
into the White House, the Democratic Speaker of the House
claimed that the Democrats yielded "to save the nation from civil
commotion."58 The "commotion," however, began after Congress
bollixed the counting process and had already irrevocably harmed
the electoral process.
There is no doubt that the Justices had the 1877 imbroglio on
their minds when they considered the issues presented in Bush
II. Justice Breyer devoted substantial space in his dissent to that
melee.59 Relying on the Twelfth Amendment, Justice Breyer
would have left the decision on the merits to Congress. ° Justice
Breyer's reliance on the Twelfth Amendment, and his comfort
54. Harris II, 772 So. 2d at 1262 ("[Mn making a determination of what is a 'legal'
vote, the standards to be employed... [are] that the vote shall be counted as a 'legal' vote
if there is 'clear indication of the intent of the voter.') (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. §
101.5614(5) (West Cum. Supp. 2000)).
55. See Bush II, 121 S. Ct. at 531 (discussing examples of varying standards applied
by Florida counties).
56. See, e.g., N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2001, at A7. Over 650 law professors signed a
document protesting the Court's December 12 decision in Bush II, and claiming that the
five Justices who decided to end the recount in Florida "vere acting as political proponents
for candidate Bush, not as Judges." Id. The list of law professors has swelled to 673. 673
Law Professors Say, at http'J/www.the-rule-of-law.com (last visited Apr. 1, 2001).
57. See infra notes 93-102 and accompanying text.
58. HARDAWAY, supra note 5, at 135.
59. See Bush II, 121 S. Ct. at 555-57 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 555.
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level with Congress's ability to handle the vote counting problem,
is remarkable. When Congress debates whether or not to count
disputed electoral votes, the enigmatic provisions of the Twelfth
Amendment are the problem-not the solution. The Twelfth
Amendment was drafted by men who did not believe in universal
suffrage.6' Moreover, the Twelfth Amendment carried forward the
classical republican ideal that all government officials, including
electors voting in the electoral college, should be specially quali-
fied gentlemen with a disinterested political perspective. 62 This
ideal was already undermined by the time the Twelfth Amend-
ment was ratified in 1804.63 By 1836, when Main Van Buren was
elected President, the political parties function was to win elec-
tions for candidates running for public office. 4 Loyalty to one's
political party became the preeminent qualification for presiden-
tial candidates. 65 The Twelfth Amendment by then was already
an anachronism. As a result, the electoral college's duties and
functions, originally outlined in Article II, Section 1, Clause 3 and
superseded by the Twelfth Amendment, are the Constitution's
Achilles' heel. The electoral college's very existence was the
source of the postelection uncertainty in 2000, and the post-
election contest Gore initiated did not concern the winner of the
popular vote in the United States. It was about the legal status of
Florida's twenty-five electors.
A set of ambiguous and little-known federal laws was enacted
in the nineteenth century to clarify and particularize provisions
of the Twelfth Amendment. One of these remedial laws is 3
U.S.C. § 5.66 Another section, 3 U.S.C. § 2,67 instructs state legis-
latures how to overcome the loss of the § 5 safe harbor.68 This sec-
61. See MICHAEL J. GLENNON, WHEN No MAJORITY RULES 7-9 (1992).
62. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AfERICAN REVOLUTION 294
(1991).
63. See id. at 293.
64. See id. at 299.
65. See id. Wood describes the transition between the classical republican paradigm
based on civic virtue and the subsequent paradigm of liberal democracy that condones the
tendency of elected public officials to represent special interest groups. See id. at 293-300.
This includes the party loyalists who are appointed to vote in the electoral college and the
members of Congress who have the power to reject them as lawful electors. See id. at 299-
300. In short, the function of electors today is entirely different than what it was in 1804
when the Twelfth Amendment was ratified.
66. 3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994).
67. 3 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
68. See id. ("Whenever any State has held an election for the purpose of choosing elec-
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tion, however, also has latent ambiguities that made the Florida
legislature's plan to appoint its own slate of electors vulnerable to
objections by Democrats.69
Harris II was decided four days before the expiration of the
safe harbor."0 The court knowingly risked the loss of the safe har-
bor, presumably hoping that the recount would be completed by
December 12.71 This hope was unrealistic. The media noticed
what would happen once the race to the White House took the na-
tion beyond that brink, even if the Florida Supreme Court did
not. Beyond the point of no return were the furies of civil commo-
tion, chaos, and grave dangers that were no longer imminent but
real. Reputable magazines, newspapers, and TV pundits identi-
fied many scenarios that were no longer pure fantasy.
Weekly newsmagazines sported covers with "CHAOS" written
in unusually large, bold type.12 "Confusion Reigns" was the title of
an article published in U.S. News & World Report, 3 and several
disturbing "what if' questions also began to surface: What if the
litigation in Florida continues beyond December 18 when the
electoral college meets?74 What if Congress receives votes from
two or three competing slates of electors? What if Congress de-
cides to reject the votes of Florida's electors when it convenes in
joint session to count votes on January 6? What if the election re-
tors, and has failed to make a choice on the day prescribed by law, the electors may be ap-
pointed on a subsequent day in such manner as the legislature of such State may direct.").
69. See id.
70. See Harris II, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1243 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
71. Cf id. at 1261 (stating that while the court recognized "that time [was]
desparately short," it could not ignore the claims made in this case).
72. See, e.g., U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 18, 2000; NEWSWEEK, Dec. 18,2000.
73. Kenneth T. Walsh, Confusion Reigns, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 18, 2000, at
21.
74. In addition to the cases discussed in this article, there were two other major cases
pending in federal court seeking to enjoin the manual recounts. See Siegel v. Lepore, 234
F.3d 1163 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 510 (2000) (mem.); Touchston v.
McDermott, 234 F.3d 1133 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 749 (2000) (mem.).
There were also several "butterfly ballotV cases. See, e.g., Fladell v. Palm Beach County
Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d 1240 (Fla. 2000). There was also a case dealing with overseas
ballots. Bush v. Hillsborough County Canvassing Bd., 123 F. Supp. 2d 1305 (N.D. Fla.
2000). Finally, there were the Seminole and Martin County cases, where, as a result of
irregularities engaged in by Republican officials and supporters of Bush, the plaintiffs
sought to throw out 25,000 votes in counties where Bush received substantially more votes
than Gore. See Taylor v. Martin County Canvassing Bd., 773 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 2000) (per
curiam); Jacobs v. Seminole County Canvassing Bd., 773 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 2000) (per cu-
riam).
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sults are not known on Inauguration Day? What if the election of
the President is thrown to the House of Representatives?75 Ac-
cording to several experts, this scene was "too horrible to contem-
plate,"76 especially since the standing rules in the House that
structure contingency elections have not been updated since
1825.77
The media was fully aware that the Florida legislature, pursu-
ant to 3 U.S.C. § 2,78 was committed irrevocably to the idea of ap-
pointing its own slate of electors immediately after the safe har-
bor benefit of 3 U.S.C. § 5 was lost.79 This unusual development
75. The colloquial phrase "thrown to the House," is technically called a contingency
election.
76. William Josephson & Beverly J. Ross, Repairing the Electoral College, J. LEGIS.
145, 148 n.21 (1996) (commenting that the prospect of the House of Representatives
promulgating new standing rules "in the context of choosing a president is too horrible to
contemplate").
77. For example, Robert M. Hardaway, writing in 1994, described why a contingency
election would be a horrible idea:
An election thrown into the House of Representatives... would indeed have
posed considerable challenges and created deep strains within the American
electoral system. There would have been powerful incentives to support or
oppose a particular House procedure, not on a principled basis but on which
candidate it would favor.
HARDAWAY, supra note 5, at 3.
One can assume that contributions to the next political campaign would flow into the
coffers of members of Congress who made commitments to vote for the candidate preferred
by the person, union, or corporation sending in the money.
78. For a discussion of 3 U.S.C. § 2, see supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
79. E.g., Filkins & Canedy, supra note 32, at A17.
This obscure provision in 3 U.S.C. § 2 was originally enacted in 1845, see Law of Jan.
23, 1845, ch. 1, 5 Stat. 721 (1845) (current version at 3 U.S.C. § 2 (1994)), and there does
not appear to be any judicial interpretation of the provision's current meaning. Counsel to
the Florida legislature advised a joint committee that 3 U.S.C. § 2 gives "the state legisla-
ture.., absolute power to determine the state's electors." SELECT JOINT COMMITTEE ON
THE MANNER OF APPOINTMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, at 7 (Dec. 4, 2000). Counsel further asserted that Congress would be
bound to count the votes of Florida's electors appointed by the Florida legislature as long
as the electors voted on December 18. Id. at 8. Bruce Ackerman and David Strauss dis-
agreed, and so testified during the hearing. Id. According to Ackerman, since the Florida
returns were already certified on November 26, a second replacement certification would
be unlawful and rejected by Congress. Id. Ackerman warned the legislature that its ap-
pointment of electors would cause a "constitutional trainwreck." Filkins & Canedy, supra
note 32, at A17. "If the Legislature took action," he warned, "it could unleash a process
that would end in a constitutional deadlock" and throw the election to the House of Repre-
sentatives. Id. It was further argued that other states would emulate Florida's example in
the future, thereby causing irreparable harm to the existing system of constitutional law.
Id. Nevertheless, on December 13, the Florida House of Representatives voted in favor of
the concurrent resolution to appoint a new slate of electors nominated by the Republican
Party. Dana Canedy, House Adopts Bush Electors, But Act May Be Moot, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
13, 2000, at A26. On December 14, the day after Gore conceded defeat, the Senate allowed
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inspired further questions. What if the Florida Supreme Court
prohibits the legislature from transmitting its new slate of elec-
tors to the Governor and to Congress? What if the court orders
Florida Governor Jeb Bush not to certify the slate or to certify a
competing Gore slate?"° What if Jeb Bush avoids, evades, or de-
fies the court order?8 ' What if he is held in contempt of court?
What if Bush appeals the court order? What will Congress do on
January 6 under this set of circumstances?
Republican leaders in the Florida legislature were nonplussed
by these questions. They were preparing for any and all possibili-
ties, and were willing to appoint the electors regardless of what
the Florida court did or said. 2 Their strategy would have com-
pletely destroyed any remaining amity between the supreme
court and Florida's legislative and executive branches. Confusion
would have indeed reigned if Congress had been presented voting
returns from the state legislature (after having already received
an identical slate from Governor Jeb Bush on November 26) and
a competing set of returns from electors voting for Gore. In this
situation, the magazine covers referring to "chaos" would not
have been mere hyperbole, and the projected nightmare scenarios
would no longer have been pure speculation. Given the "no-holds-
barred" temperament of many members of Congress, common
sense and a sophisticated sense of realpolitik suggest that power
politics would have decided which slate of electors, if any, was
lawfully appointed. The disorder that would have arisen had
Congress debated the issues resolved by the Supreme Court on
December 12, would make the partisan politics seen during the
ill-tempered Clinton impeachment hearings seem genial. Who
would have controlled the showboats? Those members who ap-
pealed to the passions of the people in strident and sarcastic
speeches.
An unusually imaginative author might have created a plot
it to die on its calendar. See Dana Canedy, Oh, That Appointed Slate? Lawmakers Are
Glad to Forget It, N.Y. TmEs, Dec. 14, 2000, at A30.
80. The executive of the state is required to sign the state's certification of electors, to
place the State seal upon the certification, and to transmit a designated number of origi-
nal-duplicates to the Archivist of the United States, who, in turn, forwards it to the Capi-
tol so the electoral votes can be counted in a joint session of Congress on the day specified
by law. 3 U.S.C. § 6 (1994).
81. This option was viewed favorably by many Florida Republicans in the legislature.
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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that has one of two presidential candidates in charge of main-
taining order and decorum in the joint session in which objections
to electors are debated, yet Gore's position as the President of the
Senate made this imaginative plot a reality. 3 How would he have
reacted to the certification of the legislatively appointed slate by
Florida Governor Jeb Bush? Undoubtedly, the then Vice Presi-
dent would have been on his best behavior, but his surrogates
would have agitated the American people in a way that would not
bode well for the nation. Justice Breyer, dissenting in Bush 11, did
not seem perturbed by this prospect.8
Justice Breyer observed that "Congress, being a political body,
expresses the people's will far more accurately than does an
unelected Court."85 Justice Breyer was willing to give the Florida
courts and county canvassing boards six more days to finish the
recount.86 The Court, however, decided not to delay the election
until the first week of January to find out which slate of electors,
if any, Congress would accept.8 " If Justice Breyer's proposal to ex-
tend the counting until December 18 had been adopted by the
Court, the issue that Congress would have resolved was whether
the Florida legislature's appointment of electors was permitted by
3 U.S.C. § 2. Without the safe harbor immunity, the Florida leg-
islature's slate of electors would have been subjected to formida-
ble objections in Congress by Democrats, arguing that "the Re-
publican Party was making a brazen effort to seize the
Presidency by assaulting the state courts and wresting power
from the voters ....
The foregoing problem is created by the need to reconcile the
Twelfth Amendment, which gives Congress the power to count,
with Article II, Section 1, Clause 2, which delegates to the state
legislatures the power to appoint electors.8 9 Does Congress's
83. The President of the Senate (Gore on Jan. 6) is assigned the duty of preserving
order during the joint meeting of the two Houses of Congress. 3 U.S.C. § 18 (1994).
84. Cf. Bush 11, 121 S. Ct. 525, 555-56 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (commenting
that "the Twelfth Amendment commits to Congress the authority and responsibility to
count electoral votes" and outlining the procedure in Congress when a state submits more
than one slate of electors).
85. Id. at 556.
86. Id. at 551-52. In that way the recount could have been completed by December 18
when the electoral college met and voted.
87. Id. at 533 (per curiam).
88. Ackerman, supra note 46, at 5.
89. Compare U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 ("Each State shall appoint, in such Manner
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power to count electoral votes trump the state legislatures' power
to appoint? According to Justice Breyer, this question is commit-
ted to Congress," but the tension between Article II and the
Twelfth Amendment presents a pure question of constitutional
law. If Congress had rejected the Florida legislature's electoral
votes sometime near the middle of January, a suit could still have
been filed in federal court before Inauguration Day. Even if the
question presented was deemed a nonjusticiable, political ques-
tion, it would have taken time, perhaps weeks, to find out that
the Court was not going to reach the merits.9 If neither candidate
was qualified to become President on January 20, then J. Dennis
Hastert, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, could have
become acting President, if he wanted the job of governing a na-
tion that might not only be evenly divided, but also polarized, an-
gry, and confused.92
C. Counting the Electoral College Votes in Congress
The electoral college is not only the Achilles heel of the Consti-
tution, but is also a Pandora's Box that would have been opened
by Congress if Justice Breyer's proposal had been adopted.93 The
last time Congress had two sets of competing returns from Flor-
ida, the partisan debate nearly caused an outbreak of violence.94
In 1877, "Democrats demanded that the election be thrown into
the House, as provided in another clause of the Twelfth Amend-
as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors... ."), with U.S. CONST.
amend. XII ("The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of
Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted .. .
90. Bush II, 121 S. Ct. at 555-56 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
91. The political question issue would be a formidable roadblock if, after Congress se-
lected the President in a contingency election, a suit was filed-an outcome that would not
be surprising. A plaintiff with standing to sue, such as Bush, the Speaker of the Florida
House of Representatives, a Florida elector, or a Florida voter, could allege that Congress
did not stay within the powers committed to it by Article I, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Con-
stitution when it rejected the electors appointed by the State legislature and certified by
the Governor.
92. See 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1) (1994) (providing for the Speaker of the House of Represen-
tatives to become President if a vacancy occurs in the offices of both President and Vice
President).
93. For a discussion of Justice Breyer's dissent in Bush II, see supra notes 84-90 and
accompanying text; infra notes 100, 125-27, 133-35, 137-39, 152, 336, 343-45, 394, 481
and accompanying text.
94. C. VANN WOoDWARD, THE ORIGINS OF THE NEW SOuTH: 1877-1913, at 25 (1st Pa-
perback ed. 1966).
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ment."95 Republicans rejected that proposal because the Demo-
crats controlled the House.96 Members of the House began to
carry arms as "debates in the House became more rancorous.""
The Electoral Count Act of 188798 was designed to alleviate the
problems that plagued the country in 1877."9 The Act has elimi-
nated many of the problems, but the procedures'0 0 established by
the Act are "in reality a constitutional minefield."'0 ' The following
list of problems is just a sampling of the ticking time bombs in the
interstices of the Twelfth Amendment.' 2
Problem #1: Completion of the process of counting electoral
votes could be delayed for long periods of time, especially if nu-
merous frivolous objections to a state's electors were filed by
members of Congress who wanted delays for tactical reasons.
Even if the objections were not frivolous, there might still be de-
lays since debates are time-consuming. In the present case, such
delays could have been particularly problematic. If Congress was
unable to complete the counting of electoral votes within five days
after its first meeting on January 6, 3 U.S.C. § 16 provides that
"no further or other recess shall be taken by either House."0 3 Sec-
95. C. VANN WOODWARD, REUNION AND REACTION 21 (3d ed. 1966).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. ch. 90, 24 Stat. 373 (1887).
99. In 1877, Justice Joseph Bradley voted with the other seven Republicans on the
fifteen member Electoral Commission appointed by Congress to break the deadlock over
the counting of electoral votes, resulting in Rutherford B. Hayes being declared President-
elect. See WOODWARD, supra note 95, at 159. Justice Bradley was accused of yielding to
pressures exerted by lobbyists. See id. at 159-64. Democratic hotheads asked whether
"honest men [should] feel obliged by the decisions of the Commission and carry the work of
conspirators into law?" Id. at 264. Despite allegations that the Justices voted their politi-
cal preferences, Bruce Ackerman proposes this solution to the impasse that would have
developed if Congress had to choose "between a Gore slate picked by Florida's voters and
the Bush slate picked by its legislature." Ackerman, supra note 46, at 5.
Aside from separation of powers problems, we should learn from history, not repeat the
mistakes we have learned from the historical record.
100. Sections 5, 6, and 7 of Title 3 of the U.S. Code all derive from the Electoral Count
Act. Bush II, 121 S. Ct. 525, 555 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
101. GLENNON, supra note 61, at 36.
102. Although both Houses of Congress meet separately after objections are made in
writing, they must concurrently agree before electoral votes from a state are rejected. See
U.S. CONST. amend. XII; 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
103. 3 U.S.C. § 16 (1994).
When objections to a state's electoral votes are received and read aloud, "the two
Houses separate to decide upon an objection that may have been made to the counting of
any electoral vote or votes from any State, or other question arising in the matter .... " Id.
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tion 16, in other words, would have permitted debates over objec-
tions to continue until January 12, which was only eight days be-
fore the incoming President took the oath of office. 10 4 Even if re-
cesses are prohibited,0 5 debates over numerous objections could
still have continued beyond Inauguration Day, which, as stated,
would have enabled the Speaker of the House to become acting
President.1 6
Problem #2: Election of the President can be thrown to the
House of Representatives if, after the electoral votes are counted,
"no person [has a] majority."0 7 A "majority" is "[the person hav-
ing the greatest number of [electoral] votes for President... if
such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors ap-
pointed ... ."0' The ambiguity of this definition could have been a
stumbling block,0 9 particularly if the safe harbor protection of
§ 17. There are time limits established for debates on specific objections. See id. These
time limits, however, do not expedite the counting process if numerous objections are duly
made in writing in accordance with 3 U.S.C. § 15. That section simply requires that every
objection be signed by at least one member of the Senate and one member of the House
and "state clearly and concisely, and without argument, the ground thereof." Id. § 15. Sec-
tion 15 further provides:
When all objections so made to any vote or paper from a State shall have been
received and read, the Senate shall thereupon withdraw [from the House
chamber], and such objections shall be submitted to the Senate for its deci-
sion; and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall, in like manner,
submit such objections to the House of Representatives for its decision ....
Id.
104. See id. § 16; see also U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1.
105. Quorum problems could occur if no official recesses are permitted. For example, to
advance a political party's decision to delay the counting process, many or all of its adher-
ents could walk out and prevent a quorum.
106. See 3 U.S.C. § 19(a)(1) (1994).
107. U.S. CONST. amend. XII. The Twelfth Amendment provides that if no one has a
majority, "then from the persons having the highest numbers [of votes] not exceeding
three... the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President,
the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote
...."Id.
108. Id.
109. The Twelfth Amendment contains ambiguous provisions with regard to the requi-
site quorum in a contingency election. See GLENNON, supra note 61, at 52-53. There are
unanswered questions concerning the public's right to observe the proceedings, whether a
majority or a plurality of a State's delegation in the House is required before a State may
cast its one vote, and whether the representatives' ballots, when each state votes, are se-
cret or open. See id. at 48-52. There are also limits on the length of time the House may
devote to the selection process, but those limits are not specific. Id. at 53. The most obvi-
ous problem is the absence of standing rules in the House, which leaves many procedural
questions unanswered, and which, therefore, have to be debated. See id. at 53-54. It is
also still plausible to argue that the lame duck Congress can seize the power to select the
20011
258 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35:237
Florida's electors was nonexistent, as would have been the situa-
tion had the Court ducked the tough questions presented in Bush
Ii.
According to the most common view, a candidate must have at
least 270 electoral votes out of the 535 electors appointed by the
fifty states and the District of Columbia to have a majority.110
Neither Bush nor Gore had 270 electoral votes on December 12.
Therefore, if both Houses of Congress had rejected Florida's
twenty-five electoral votes, selection of the President would have
been thrown to the House of Representatives and the Senate
would have chosen the Vice President."' Since Bush was more
likely to win such a contingency election,"' a plaintiff could have
filed a lawsuit claiming that Congress did not adhere to the
Twelfth Amendment's definition of a majority.
The political question doctrine could, perhaps, be avoided by
the following argument: The word "majority" in the Twelfth
Amendment is a pure question of law for the Court. There would
be no problem with judicially manageable standards if the Court
ruled that a majority is a majority of electoral votes counted
rather than a majority of electors appointed. The plaintiff could
cite Powell v. McCormack,"' a case in which the House of Repre-
sentatives excluded Adam Clayton Powell from his seat in the
House after he won an election for the seat."' Powell sued the
Speaker, John McCormack." 5 The Court held that Congress vio-
lated Article I, Section 2, Clause 2 (the age, citizenship, and resi-
President in January before the incoming Congress replaces it. Id. at 46-48. Finally, there
is the concern about shady, "back-room" deals. See id. at 54.
110. See id. at 19. The Twenty-Third Amendment authorizes the District of Columbia
to appoint
[a] number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole
number of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District
would be entitled if it were a State, but in no event more than the least
populous State... and they shall meet in the District and perform such du-
ties as provided by the twelfth article of amendment."
U.S. CONST. amend. XXIII, § 1.
111. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
112. Twenty-eight state delegations had more Republicans than Democrats. What if
Florida Ends Up with Two Slates of Electors?, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 9, 2000, at Al (providing a
flow-chart mapping out the possible outcomes if there were two slates of Florida electors).
113. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
114. Id. at 489.
115. Id. at 493.
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dence requirements) and specifically rejected the applicability of
the political question doctrine."6 The Court stated: "Our system
of government requires that federal courts on occasion interpret
the Constitution in a manner at variance with the construction
given the document by another branch." 7 Furthermore, the
Court asserted its authority "to act as the ultimate interpreter of
the Constitution.""8
Even if the Court chose not to decide whether Gore needed at
least 270 votes, the election might still have been delayed beyond
January 20. By the time the Court decided to abstain, Congress
would have been unable to have a contingency election since the
joint session would have adjourned." 9 On the other hand, if there
had been a contingency election based on a party-line vote and
Bush had won, the imprimatur of a Republican dominated House
of Representatives would not have carried the prestige of a Su-
preme Court decision. Bush's presidency would have been tainted
and his honeymoon nonexistent. Indeed, a contingency election
could have caused a civil commotion that would have weakened
both the office of the President and the nation.
A President who is compelled by circumstances to make com-
mitments to members of Congress in exchange for their votes
cannot be a strong President. Moreover, Pandora's Box would be
opened and foreign and domestic enemies of the United States,
who after biding their time until they could take advantage of so-
cial unrest and disarray in the nation's government, would sud-
denly appear.
Problem #3: As indicated in the foregoing discussion of Problem
#2, Congress could have considered a more flexible interpretation
116. Id. at 522.
117. Id. at 549.
118. Id. (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)); see also Cooper v.
Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (noting the supremacy of the Court).
119. LAWRENCE D. LONGLEY & NEAL R. PEiRCE, THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE PRIMER
2000, at 14-15 (1999). Longley and Peirce state that after the Speaker orders the cessation
of fruitless House efforts to elect a President within the time limits referred to in the
Twelfth Amendment, which optimistically requires an immediate decision, the Speaker is
entitled to resign and assume the office of Acting President. Id. Thus, in this case, the
Speaker could have remained in office "subject to the possibility that renewed House bal-
loting.., following the congressional elections of 2002" would replace him. Id. at 15. Obvi-
ously, such a bizarre turn of events would traumatize the nation for months or years dur-
ing this political and constitutional crisis. Id. at 15-16.
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of the meaning of the word "majority" in the Twelfth Amendment.
In our hypothetical situation, Gore could have been declared
President under this alternative since he already had the major-
ity he needed. Undoubtedly, Democrats would have argued in fa-
vor of such a flexible interpretation; however, as stated previ-
ously, this kind of partisan debate in Congress would make the
members' invectives during the Clinton impeachment seem mild.
The Court would again be involved, but this time, Bush would ar-
gue that by adopting this interpretation Congress exceeded the
powers committed to it by the Twelfth Amendment.'
Problem #4: The Twelfth Amendment states: "The President of
the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Rep-
resentatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be
counted.... .12  This language does not specify, however, what
the rules for counting are. As stated previously, the Electoral
Count Act was designed to alleviate the problems caused by the
lack of rules that plagued the country in 1877.122 While the Act
eliminated many problems, many remain. For example, a provi-
sion now codified as 3 U.S.C. § 15 permits Congress to reject elec-
toral votes not "regularly given" by lawfully certified electors, not
appointed by a lawful tribunal, and not authorized by state law.'23
These ambiguous grounds would have given members of Congress
ammunition to reject Florida's electoral votes, and debates over
their objections could have precipitated a Donnybrook Fair.2 For
example, are electors appointed by the Florida legislature lawful
electors? Are their votes regularly given? These ambiguous
grounds would also have enabled Republicans to challenge votes
returned by a Gore slate, and many of the legal issues such as
due process, equal protection, and Article II violations by the
Florida Supreme Court would have been the same as those re-
solved in Bush 1.
120. The political question doctrine again might influence the Court to abstain from
this "hot potato" of an issue. However, Bush would have precedent to evade the doctrine.
See supra notes 113-18 and accompanying text.
121. U.S. CONST. amend. XII.
122. See supra notes 88-102 and accompanying text.
123. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
124. Four years before the 2000 presidential election, Congress was advised to "clarify
sections 5 and 15 to make clear that any authoritative state determination is conclusive."
Josephson & Ross, supra note 76, at 182. Even this suggestion, however, begs the question
posed in our hypothetical scenario, which is whether the Florida Supreme Court, the
Florida legislature, or the executive branch is the body that makes the authoritative de-
termination about the appointment of electors.
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Justice Breyer, dissenting in Bush II, preferred to rely on the
counting rules in 3 U.S.C. § 15 rather than support the majority's
decision that brought finality.125 He argued that "the Twelfth
Amendment commits to Congress the authority and responsibility
to count electoral votes."'26 Thus, in Justice Breyer's view, the
Court should not have ended the recount.
12 7
To be sure, Congress, not the Court, has the duty to count the
votes and to accept or reject electors. 2 ' However, the language of
the Twelfth Amendment does not specifically prohibit the Court
from making decisions that affect the counting before Congress
meets in joint session. In fact, 3 U.S.C. § 5 "represented an effort
by Congress to wash its hands of these [counting] matters after
the disputed Hayes-Tilden election in 1876."129 The Court's inter-
vention kept Congress's hands clean.
Why would Justice Breyer prefer to encounter the minefields
embedded in 3 U.S.C. § 15 when Congress, by enacting 3 U.S.C. §
5, preferred to adhere to Article II and allow the state legislatures
to retain their traditional responsibility to resolve controversies
over electors? One answer may lie in Justice Breyer's assertion
that "[James] Madison... believed that allowing the judiciary to
choose the presidential electors 'was out of the question." 130 This
assertion is half true. Madison's own notes taken at the Philadel-
phia Convention reveal that after he stated that it "was out of the
question" for the judiciary to choose the President in a contin-
gency election, he then said that the choice by Congress "was in
his Judgment liable to insuperable objections."'' Madison's per-
sonal preference was for a direct election of the President by the
people. 3
2
125. Bush II, 121 S. Ct. 525, 556-58 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 555.
127. See id. at 551, 558.
128. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII; 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
129. GLENNON, supra note 61, at 31.
130. Bush II, 121 S. Ct. at 556 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (quoting James Madison (July
25, 1787), in 5 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 363 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1876)).
131. NOTES OF THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 REPORTED BY
JAMES MADISON 363 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1987) (1893). Gouverneur Morris warned that
giving Congress power to select the President would inevitably be productive of "intrigue,
of cabal, and of faction,' producing a pliable official who would be the willing tool of his
supporters." JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANING 259 (1996).
132. See WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE BUSINESS OF MAY NEXT: JAMES MADISON AND THE
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Justice Breyer agreed that, given the safe harbor deadline, "it
[was] too late for any such recount to take place by December
12."' He pointed out, however, that the electoral college's vote
was only six days away (on December 18) and that a continuation
of the manual recount during those six days might have allowed
for its completion.'34 That wishful thinking emulates Pollyanna's
optimism. Nevertheless, Justice Breyer, relying on notions of
comity, insisted that "[w]hether there [was] time to conduct a re-
count prior to December 18, when the electors [were] scheduled to
meet, [was] a matter for the state courts to determine."'35 As to
whether a six-day extension violated any state statute, as the
Court had held,3 6 that question too was one for the Florida Su-
preme Court, 37 even though that court risked the loss of the safe
harbor benefit, which Justice Breyer admitted was gone.
31
Justice Breyer must have been aware that his proposal to ex-
tend the counting period until December 18 (the day the electoral
college votes) was unrealistic. There were 170,000 ballots to visu-
ally inspect, 39 and it takes time to devise new counting standards
that comply with state law, federal statutes, and the U.S. Consti-
tution.40 It would have taken even more time to hold an eviden-
tiary hearing in Leon County if voters had filed suit and objected
to the revised counting procedures.
To comply strictly with due process of law, the Florida Su-
preme Court would have been obligated to hear objections to its
new counting standards, give the parties a hearing, and provide
an opportunity to have an oral argument and file briefs.' This
process could have commenced as early as December 13. Is it
FOUNDING 85 (1992).
133. Bush II, 121 S. Ct. at 552 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
134. See id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 533 (per curiam).
137. See id. at 552 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
138. See id.
139. Id. at 546. This number includes overvotes as well as undervotes, which the Court
concluded should have been included in any recount that comports with the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. See id. at 532 (per curiam); id. at 545-46 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing Harris
11, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1264 n.26 (Fla. 2000) (Wells, C.J., dissenting)); see also Harris 11, 772
So. 2d at 1270-71 (Harding, J., dissenting). The figure of 170,000 ballots was also found in
a public record affording Justice Breyer the opportunity to take judicial notice of it. See id.
at 1271 n.33.
140. See Bush I1, 121 S. Ct. at 532.
141. See id.
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likely that the counting could have begun before December 16?142
Assuming that counting could have begun on December 16 (a
Saturday) and continued all day Sunday, it would have been vir-
tually impossible to complete the counting of 170,000 ballots early
enough on Monday, December 18 to give Gore time to obtain a
certificate of ascertainment.'43 The Secretary of State might well
have been ordered, as a party in Harris II, to sign the certificate,
but the signature of the Governor is also required.' Certainly,
the Governor would have been in no hurry to sign a certification
of electors appointed by the Democratic Party, since he would
have likely just signed the certification of electors appointed by
the Florida legislature (on or about December 14).
In addition, there would have been numerous new lawsuits
filed over the objections overruled or sustained during the man-
ual recounts in sixty-seven counties. This inevitable new round of
litigation naming several county canvassing boards as defendants
should have ended any speculation by Justice Breyer that a
timely slate of electors appointed by Democrats could have voted
in the electoral college. 45 Moreover, even if a Democratic slate of
electors had actually voted on December 18, Justice Breyer's pro-
posal was still risky because the Electoral Count Act is drafted
too imprecisely to solve the problem of choosing between the
Florida legislature's slate, pledged to Bush, and a last minute
slate pledged to Gore.' Justice Breyer's proposal also runs coun-
ter to the Court's plausible conclusion that the Florida legislature
intended to abide, not by the December 18 deadline, but by the
142. The Miami Herald's manual recount of 10,000 undervotes in Miami-Dade County
completed on (or about) February 26 required eighty hours of work Amy Driscoll, 'Under-
vote' Review Holds Win for Bush, Independent Recount Held in South Florida, FLA. TIMES-
UNION (Jacksonville), Feb. 26, 2001, at Al, available at 2001 WL 7004484. Had they
counted the overvotes, it probably would have taken twice as long.
143. See 3 U.S.C. § 6 (1994) (explaining the necessity and importance of certificates of
final ascertainment and how they are transmitted to Congress from the states).
144. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ i02.111 to .121 (West 1982 & Cum. Supp. 2001).
The plan of Tom Feeney, Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives was to file
the legislature's appointment of electors pledged to Bush with the Secretary of State, and
to have a copy certified by her delivered to the Archives in Washington, D.C. under a sec-
ond transmittal letter signed by Governor Jeb Bush. E-mail from Donald Rubottom, Aide
and Legal Advisory to Tom Feeney, Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives, to
Gary C. Leedes, Professor of Law, Emeritus, University of Richmond School of Law (Mar.
15, 2001, 13:54:10 EST) (on file with author).
145. Cf. Bush II, 121 S. Ct. at 552 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that whether or not
there was time to complete a manual recount by December 18 was a matter for the Florida
courts to decide).
146. See Electoral Count Act, ch. 90, 24 Stat. 373 (1887).
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December 12 deadline specified in 3 U.S.C. § 5.147
There was little likelihood that both Houses of Congress would
have rejected the electors certified by Florida's executive branch,
as there were just too many Republicans in the House of Repre-
sentatives. 148 As a result, the following requirement in 3 U.S.C. §
15 would have been triggered: "If the two Houses shall disagree
in respect of the counting of such votes, then, and in that case,
the votes of the electors whose appointment shall have been certi-
fied by the executive of the State, under the seal thereof, shall be
counted."1 49
The irony implicit in the disagreement between Justice Breyer
and the Bush II majority is that, under the most likely scenario,
Bush would have become President even if Justice Breyer's pro-
posal had been adopted. Thus, the Court sensibly avoided wasting
time and effort by rejecting his proposal. Even if most of the Re-
publicans voting to count Florida's twenty-five electoral votes
were hoping that President Bush's future appointees to the Court
would overrule Roe v. Wade,150 any unethical motivation attrib-
uted to three of the Justices' 5' was unnecessary and, therefore,
untenable. If Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Thomas wanted the Court stacked with Justices intent on over-
ruling Roe, they could have accomplished this goal by accepting
Justice Breyer's proposal.
52
With reference to the focal points covered in this article, the
majority's decision to stop the counting is defensible because it
avoided (1) the risk, however slight, of throwing the election to
the House, (2) the likely risk that the outcome of the presidential
election would have been delayed until the joint session of Con-
gress convened, and (3) the likelihood that the new President's
legitimacy would have been tainted, perhaps beyond repair, if his
election depended on the partisan votes of a Republican House of
Representatives.
147. See Bush II, 121 S. Ct at 538.
148. See supra note 112.
149. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994).
150. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 40-41.
152. Justice Breyer also took the concurring Justices to task because they concluded
that the Florida court impermissibly distorted state law. See Bush II, 121 S. Ct. at 553
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing id. at 535 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)). In order to evalu-
ate the arguments of Justice Breyer and the concurring Justices, it is necessary to become
immersed in the details of some very confusing state statutes.
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II. PRAGMATIC CRISIS MANAGEMENT
A. Prelude
On November 8, 2000, Florida's Secretary of State,153 Katherine
Harris, informed the public that Bush had won the election in
Florida by 1784 votes.'54 This margin of victory was so narrow
that it required an automatic recount under Florida law.'55 The
automatic recount narrowed Bush's lead to 300 votes. 56
That same day several citizens who intended to vote for Gore
but unwittingly voted for Pat Buchanan filed voter disenfran-
chisement suits claiming that Palm Beach County's misleading
"butterfly" ballot confused them.57 They wanted the ballot design
that bewildered them declared illegal, the election to be declared
null and void, and a decree ordering a revote in Palm Beach
County.5 ' Similar lawsuits were also filed on November 9.159
These plaintiffs were ultimately unsuccessful in the Florida Su-
preme Court,160 and early bird plaintiffs in other lawsuits (in-
cluding two fied in federal district courts) also did not prevail. 161
153. The Secretary of State is an elected constitutional officer and a member of Flor-
ida's executive cabinet. See FLA. CONST. art IV, § 4(a). The Florida legislature designated
the Secretary of State as the state's chief election officer. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 15.13
(West 1982 & Cum. Supp. 2001). The Secretary is required to -[o]btain and maintain uni-
formity in the application, operation, and interpretation of the election laws." Id. §
97.012(1).
154. See Bush I, 121 S. Ct. at 527-28.
155. Florida law requires an automatic recount in all races where the final differential
between two candidates is 0.5% or less. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.141(4) (West 1982 & Cum.
Supp. 2001). The mandatory, automatic recount repeats the same tabulation procedures
that were followed by sixty-seven Florida canvassing boards on November 7. See id.
156. Touchston v. McDermott, 234 F.3d 1133, 1135 (11th Cir. 2000) (Tjoflat, J., dis-
senting), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 749 (2000) (mem.).
157. Complaint for Declaratory Relief 15, Fladell v. Palm Beach County Canvassing
Bd., No. CL 00-10965 AB (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 18, 2000); Fladell v. Palm Beach County
Canvassing Bd., 772 So. 2d 1240, 1242 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
158. See Complaint for Declaratory Relief 26, Fladell v. Palm Beach County Can-
vassing Bd., No. CL 00-10965 AB (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 18, 2000); Fladell, 772 So. 2d at
1242; see also Margaret Graham Tebo & Siobhan Morrissey, A Week in the Hurricane,
A.B. J., Jan. 2001, at 45.
159. E.g., Complaint for Declaratory Judgment 1 10, Elkin v. LePore, No. CL 00-
109888 AE (Fla. Cir. Ct. filed Nov. 9, 2000).
160. Fladell, 772 So. 2d at 1242.
16L See Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1168 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct.
510 (2000) (mem.); Touchston, 234 F.3d at 1134.
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The issues resolved in the state court cases 62 are not germane
to the very different issues eventually resolved by the Supreme
Court in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board6 ' (Bush
I) and Bush II. The plaintiffs in the two cases filed in federal
court, however, based their claims for injunctive relief on the
Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment."64 The district courts denied all plaintiffs re-
lief because they failed, inter alia, to establish irreparable
harm. 6 ' On December 6, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the deci-
sions of the district courts without prejudice to the plaintiffs."
Two days later, the Florida Supreme Court decided Harris II,
which was later found by a majority of the Supreme Court to have
caused irreparable harm in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
167
The timeline pertinent to the issues resolved in Bush II began
on November 9, when the Florida Democratic Executive Commit-
162. On December 12, the Florida Supreme Court refused to invalidate all or a portion
of 25,000 absentee ballots from Seminole and Martin counties, and it affirmed the rulings
of the two lower courts that had refused to disqualify any of the ballots. See Taylor v. Mar-
tin County Canvassing Bd., 773 So. 2d 517, 519 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam); Jacobs v. Semi-
nole County Canvassing Bd., 773 So. 2d 519, 523-24 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
The plaintiffs in Taylor alleged that many absentee ballots had been cast by voters who
received help from Republican officials in filling out the ballot applications. Taylor, 773 So.
2d at 518. The trial court held "that 'despite these irregularities... the sanctity of the
ballot and the integrity of the election were not affected' and that '[t]he election... was a
full and fair expression of the will of the people.'" Id. at 519 (quoting Taylor v. Martin
County Canvassing Bd., No. CV 00-2850, 2000 WL 1793409, at *5 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 8,
2000)).
The plaintiff in Jacobs alleged irregularities, including the acceptance by the Supervi-
sor of Elections of help from Republican Party representatives. Jacobs, 773 So. 2d at 521.
The representatives had gained access to the County Supervisor's office to add voter iden-
tification numbers to requests for absentee ballots that did not contain that information.
Id. at 521. The lower court concluded that this assistance did not affect the integrity of the
election, and that the irregularities did not violate applicable Florida law. Id. at 523. The
Florida Supreme Court affirmed the conclusion of the trial court. Id. at 523-24.
163. 121 S. Ct. 471 (2000) (per curiam).
164. See Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1175; Touchston, 234 F.3d at 1137 (Ijoflat, J., dissenting).
165. See Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1170; Touchston, 234 F.3d at 1138 (TIjoflat, J., dissenting).
166. Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1179; Touchston, 234 F.3d at 1134.
167. See Bush II, 121 S. Ct. 525, 529-33 (2000) (per curiam). Indeed, on December 8,
the Florida Supreme Court ordered a new round of manual recounts that fully ripened the
Equal Protection and Due Process issues. See Harris II, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1262 (Fla. 2000)
(per curiam). Days before the Supreme Court decided Bush II, plaintiffs in Siegel and
Touchston filed petitions for certiorari with the Court. Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163
(11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 510 (2000) (mem.); Touchston v. McDermott, 234
F.3d 1133 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 749 (2000) (mem.).
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tee requested manual recounts in four heavily Democratic coun-
ties-Broward, Miami-Dade, Palm Beach, and Volusia.168 Sample
recounts began shortly thereafter.'69
B. The Law Applicable to Precertification Manual Recounts
1. The Permissibility of Manual Recounts
Under Florida law, any candidate or voter has the right to file
a protest of an election with a county canvassing board. 7 ° In re-
sponse to a timely request for a manual recount, a county can-
vassing board may conduct a partial recount involving at least
three precincts and at least one percent of the votes cast for the
protesting candidate or political party.'' If this sampling shows
an "error in vote tabulation," section 102.166(5) of the Florida
Election Code applies, which provides that the county canvassing
board shall "[correct the error and recount the remaining pre-
cincts with the vote tabulation system; [r]equest the Department
of State to verify the tabulation software; or [mianually recount
all ballots."
72
Although Florida's Election Code describes the functions of offi-
cials responsible for conducting manual recounts, it does not con-
tain any specific standard for evaluating voter intent."' There-
fore, counties may adopt stricter or more lenient evaluative
standards.
Section 102.166 is susceptible to two different and conflicting
interpretations. First, it can be interpreted to authorize manual
recounts only if a county's vote counting system (machine and
168. Harris III, 772 So. 2d 1273, 1279 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
169. See id. The county canvassing boards of the four counties selected by Gore "deter-
mined that the [sample] manual recounts showed an 'error in the vote tabulation which
could affect the outcome of the election,' and the Boards voted to conduct countywide man-
ual recounts." Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(5) (West Cum. Supp. 2000)).
The reason to conduct a manual recount, of course, is to determine whether a human
being's eyes might discern the voter's intent from ballots that were unreadable by ma-
chines. For example, this may be due to a voter's failure to mark or punch the ballots in a
manner that the machine can read.
170. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166(1) (West 1982 & Cum. Supp. 2001).
171. See id. § 102.166(4)(d) (West Cum. Supp. 2001).
172. Id. § 102.166(5)(a)-(c).
173. See id. § 102.166(7)(b).
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software) does not function as intended. The Florida Division of
Elections. 4 and the Secretary of State endorsed this compara-
tively objective interpretation. 175
Florida's Secretary of State, Katherine Harris, argued that
"[blefore the decision of the Florida Supreme Court, the Division
had interpreted the Election Code to allow for a manual recount
only when there was some failure in the vote tabulation sys-
tem."'76 The Division's interpretation, she argued, was based on
the language of the statute, its legislative history, and the ab-
sence of any precedent indicating that manual recounts could be
used to determine voter intent simply because the ballot was not
marked or punched properly by the voter. 7 The county canvass-
ing boards decided not to follow the Division of Election's advisory
opinion;.. and, instead, relied on conflicting advice obtained from
Florida's Attorney General.'79
174. Florida's Division of Elections is a subagency of the Department of State and is
subordinate to the Secretary of State and to the Election Canvassing Commission, which
itself is a special purpose agency composed of the Governor, the Secretary of State, and the
Director of the Division of Elections. See id. § 102.111(1)-(2) (West 1982 & Cum. Supp.
2000). The Florida legislature has charged the Division of Elections with the responsibility
of responding to questions submitted by county canvassing boards concerning the conduct
of elections. Id. § 106.23. These responses are binding advisory opinions. Id.
175. Op. Fla. Div. of Elections No. DE 00-11 (Nov. 13, 2000), reprinted in Joint Appen-
dix at 52-53, Bush I, 121 S. Ct. 471 (2000) (No. 00-836); Brief on the Merits of Respon-
dents Katherine Harris, Florida Secretary of State, and Katherine Harris, Laurence C.
Roberts, and Bob Crawford as Members of the Florida Elections Canvassing Commission
at 9, Bush I, 121 S. Ct. 471 (2000) (No. 00-836) [hereinafter Brief on the Merits of Respon-
dents Katherine Harris et al.]
Judge Tjoflat stated that "[tihe Secretary's vote counting model.., applied a fixed, ob-
jective standard for determining voter intent-voters were required to indicate their vot-
ing intent unequivocally by marking [or punching] their ballots in such a way that the
vote tabulating machine, with its preprogrammed evaluation standard [can] read it."
Touchston v. McDermott, 234 F.3d 1133, 1141 (11th Cir. 2000) (TIjoflat, J., dissenting).
Judge TIjoflat went on to state that "[tihe machine model thus relies on an objective tabu-
lating machine that admits of no discretion to count votes-if a vote is properly cast ac-
cording to instructions given to the voter, the machine will count it." Id. Finally, he con-
cluded that "[tihe Secretary of State, pursuant to her authority under section 97.012(1),
interpreted the statutory system as the machine model." Id. at 1142.
176. Brief on the Merits of Respondents Katherine Harris et al. at 9, Bush I (No. 00-
836).
177. See id.
178. See Harris 1, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1225 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
179. See Brief on the Merits of Respondents Katherine Harris et al. at 10 n.6, Bush I
(No. 00-836).
The Florida Attorney General is an independently elected, coequal cabinet officer who
is the chief legal officer of the state and who may issue advisory opinions. See FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 16.01(3) (West 1998). "Opinions of the Attorney General unlike those of the Divi-
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The Division of Elections' binding advisory opinion stated:
An "error in the vote tabulation" means a counting error in which
the vote tabulation system fails to count properly marked mark-
sense 180 or properly punched punchcard ballots. Such an error could
result from incorrect election parameters, or an error in the vote
tabulation and reporting software of the voting system. The inability
of a voting system to read an improperly marked marksense or im-
properly punched card ballot is not a [sic] "error in the vote tabula-
tion."
181
In other words, the failure of voters to execute their ballots in ac-
cordance with the instructions supplied to them by the counties
was not a basis for conducting a precertification manual re-
count.
182
sion [of Elections], are not binding on the party seeking the opinion." Brief on the Merits of
Respondents Katherine Harris et al. at 5, Bush I (No. 00-836). Florida's Attorney General
does not usually issue opinions on election matters. See id. ("[Ilt is the policy of this office
to refer all questions concerning the Elections Code... to the Division [of Elections] for its
response.") (citing Fla. Opp. Att'y Gen. No. 86-55 (1986)). It is also doubtful that the At-
torney General has jurisdiction in such matters. See id.
180. In Touchston, Judge Tjoflat explained:
In counties that use so-called marksense technology, voters record their votes
by using a pen or a pencil to fill in geometric figures (circles, ovals, squares, or
rectangles) next to candidates for which they wish to vote. Marksense vote
tabulating machines use optical scanning technology to detect the darkened
figures and count the votes accordingly.
Touchston, 234 F.3d at 1140 n.16 (Tioflat, J., dissenting).
181. Op. Fla. Div. of Elections No. DE 00-11 (Nov. 13, 2000), reprinted in Joint Appen-
dix at 53, Bush I (No. 00-836). The Division issued its advisory opinion in response to a
request from the Palm Beach Board. Id. at 52.
182. See Op. Fla. Div. of Elections No. DE 00-12 (Nov. 13, 2000), reprinted in Joint Ap-
pendix at 55, Bush I (No. 00-836). The opinion of the Florida Division of Elections guided
the Secretary of State, the official authorized to issue binding instructions concerning the
implementation of the election code. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 97.012, 106.23 (West 1982 &
Cum. Supp. 2001). She rejected the unprecedented interpretation of the Attorney General,
who lacked authority to countermand her interpretations. See Harris I, 772 So. 2d at 1226.
According to the Secretary, a ballot improperly cast is not a legal vote. See id. at 1226 n.5.
Each county and precinct within the county on and before election day must provide
instructions on how to properly cast a vote, and each voting booth provided a sample bal-
lot. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.46 (West 1982 & Cum. Supp. 2001). For example, Palm
Beach County, which used punch card ballots, provided instructions that stated in bold
capital letters: "After voting, check your ballot card to be sure your voting selections are
clearly and cleanly punched and that there are no chips left hanging on the back of the
card." Bush II, 121 S. Ct. 525, 537 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); Touchston, 234
F.3d at 1141 n.19 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting). In Broward County, which also uses punch card
technology, the instructions stated: "To vote, hold the stylus vertically. Punch the stylus
straight down through the ballot card for the candidates or issues of your choice." Touch-
ston, 234 F.3d at 1141 n.19 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting).
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Florida's Attorney General disagreed."3 Under his view, a vote
was valid so long as a visual inspection of the punch card demon-
strated the voter's intent in any ascertainable manner.' 84 There-
fore, manual recounts were warranted even if voters improperly
executed their ballots.
Like the Attorney General, the Florida Supreme Court rejected
the Division of Election's interpretation of the law stating that
the Division's interpretation was "contrary to ... the plain
meaning of section 102.166(5)." "5 Arguably, this startling conclu-
sion was a retroactive change in state law because Florida courts
are expected to "defer to an agency's interpretation of statutes
and rules the agency is charged with implementing and enforc-
ing." "' Whether the court impermissibly changed state law retro-
actively is the question that Congress would have had to address
and answer if it had been required to decide whether to reject
Florida's twenty-five electoral votes.8 7 Indeed, if Congress had
concluded that the Florida court retroactively changed state law
as it existed on election day, Florida's certified electors would
have been vulnerable to objections made by Democrats because
they would have lost their safe harbor immunity. '
183. Fla. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 00-65 (Nov. 14, 2000), available at 2000 WL 1707267, at
*3 ("[The term 'error in voter tabulation' encompasses a discrepancy between the number
of votes determined by a voter tabulation system and the number of votes determined by a
manual count of a sampling ofprecincts .... ).
The Attorney General preferred the model backed by the Florida Democratic Executive
Committee that also turned out to be the model endorsed by the Florida Supreme Court on
November 21. Harris I, 772 So. 2d at 1229-30. The vote counting model that emerged from
Harris I required the canvassing boards to count votes that were cast improperly-, thereby
allowing hand-counters in some counties to conclude that an indented or dimpled ballot
was a legal vote, even though the voting machines were not programmed to count these
erroneously punched ballots. See id. at 1229. Gore selected the counties before the Su-
preme Court of Florida got involved.
184. See Fla. Op. Atty. Gen. No. 00-65 (Nov. 14, 2000), available at 2000 WL 1707267,
at *2. In Touchston, Judge Tjoflat noted in his dissent that a letter, dated November 14,
from Attorney General Robert Butterworth to Palm Beach Board Member Charles Burton
stated that "the Division's opinion is wrong in several respects,'" adding that "where a
ballot is so marked as to plainly indicate the voter's choice and intent, it should be counted
as marked unless some positive provision of law would be violated.'" Touchston, 234 F.3d
at 147-48 (TIjoflat, J., dissenting).
185. Harris I, 772 So. 2d at 1228.
186. Id. In the past, the Florida Supreme Court gave "deference to decisions made by
executive officials charged with implementing Florida's election laws." Harris II, 772 So.
2d 1243, 1263 (Fla. 2000) (Wells, C.J., dissenting) (citing Krivanek v. Take Back Tampa
Political Comm., 625 So. 2d 840 (Fla. 1993)).
187. See 3 U.S.C. § 5 (1994).
188. See id.
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Bush's allegation that the court changed the law retroactively
was corroborated by several comments made in Palm Beach
County Canvassing Board v. Harris89 (Harris 1). For example,
the court "commented that the will of the people, not a hyper-
technical reliance upon statutory provisions, should be [the
court's] guiding principle in election cases." 9 ' Moreover, the court
stressed that "[t]he abiding principle governing all election law in
Florida is set forth in... [the] Florida Constitution."191 The court
noted that Article I, Section 1 of the Florida Constitution states
that "l'[all political power is inherent in the people.""92 In the con-
cluding section of its opinion, the court emphasized that an equi-
table remedy was required to correct the harm caused by the con-
flicting advice given by the Division of Elections and the Attorney
General. 193
The court fashioned an equitable remedy that gave counties
more time to file amended certifications. 94 The court's new dead-
line was November 26, at 5:00 p.m. (twelve days after the dead-
line indicated in the relevant Florida statutes).' 9 Thus, the court
relied on a combination of its equitable powers, the Florida Con-
stitution, and its case law-case law that did not deal with fed-
eral elections. 9 ' This eclectic selection of authority strengthened
Bush's claim that the court's retroactive tampering with election
laws jeopardized the safe harbor that the Florida legislature
wished to preserve.' 9 Attorneys for Bush took advantage of the
fact that the court never explicitly cited 3 U.S.C. § 5 as a provi-
sion that circumscribed its discretion to determine what was a
reasonable extension of the time specified in the Florida stat-
utes.
198
189. 772 So. 2d 1220 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
190. Id. at 1227. The Florida Supreme Court relied on precedent in state and county
elections, but there was no case law supporting these guiding principles in elections for
federal officials.
191 Id. at 1230.
192. Id. (quoting FLA. CONST. art. I, § 1).
193. Id. at 1240.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1239-40.
197. See Brief for Petitioners at 35-36, Bush I, 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000) (No. 00-949); cf.
Bush I, 121 S. Ct. at 538 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("Surely when the Florida legisla-
ture empowered the courts of the State to grant 'appropriate' relief, it must have meant
relief that would have become final by the cutoff date of 3 U.S.C. § 5.").
19. See infra notes 199-201, 216 and accompanying text (discussing the Florida
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The court cited 3 U.S.C. § 5 only once in a footnote that re-
ferred generically to 3 U.S.C. §§ 1-10.' The footnote, inserted
without comment, supposedly clarified the statement that the
Secretary may ignore late returns if they would "preclud[e] Flor-
ida voters from participating fully in the federal electoral proc-
ess." 00 When one considers, this m6lange of equity plus guiding,
abiding, and novel principles minus adequate references to fed-
eral law, the court's vacatur is not shocking.20 '
The remand in Bush I directed the court to clarify precisely
upon what law it was relying, and to explain the extent to which
it considered the safe harbor privilege afforded by 3 U.S.C. § 5.202
Simply put, the Court looked at the Florida Supreme Court's
opinion and said: "Your decision is vacated! Please read Article II
of the U.S. Constitution and 3 U.S.C. § 5 more carefully."
The Supreme Court informed the Florida court that the state
laws it had so generously interpreted to discern the will of the
people203 were enacted by a legislature that "[was] not acting
court's analysis of the relevant statutory provisions).
199. Harris I, 772 So. 2d at 1237 n.55.
200. Id. at 1237.
201. The court did not rely on Article II of the Constitution, but it did rely on Roude-
bush v. Harke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972), a case that construed Article I, Section 4. See Harris I,
772 So. 2d at 1238. Article I, Section 4 provides that "[tihe Times, Places and Manner of
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by
the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such
Regulations ... ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. The Court, in Roudebush, held that Indi-
ana's law authorizing recounts in an election of a U.S. Senator, which delays the Secretary
of State's certification, did not infringe upon the power of the U.S. Senate to be the judge
of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members. Roudebush, 405 U.S. at
25-26. This holding indicates, rather precisely, what was wrong with the Florida court's
reliance on Article I, Section 4. Florida's legislature, unlike Indiana's, did not want Con-
gress to be the judge of Florida's electors; it wished to have the protection afforded by
3.U.S.C. § 5. Brief for Petitioners at 35, Bush II, 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000) (No. 00-949). The
electors' immunity from congressional scrutiny disappeared when the state judiciary
changed state law concerning recounts after the election. For that reason, Justice Stev-
ens's dissent in Bush II misses the point. Justice Stevens could not see why Article II, Sec-
tion 1 should be interpreted any differently than Article I, Section 4. See Bush II, 121 S.
Ct. at 539 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The reason, assuming arguendo that Article II is
being interpreted differently, is 3 U.S.C § 5, which gives the state legislature a privilege
and immunity not granted by Congress in Article I, Section 4 cases.
Moreover, there was no dispute about the meaning of state law in Roudebush. The
state legislature itself, not the state judiciary, provided that its recount procedure super-
seded the deadline for certification. See Brief for Petitioners at 25 n.22, Bush II (No. 00-
949).
202. Bush I, 121 S. Ct. 471, 475 (2000) (per curiam).
203. In a striking admission, the Florida Supreme Court stated that "[b]y refusing to
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solely under the authority given it by the people of the State, but
by virtue of a direct grant of authority made under Article II, § 1,
ci. 2, of the United States Constitution." 4 In view of this re-
minder, the Florida court was put on notice that the statutory
right of Florida citizens to vote in presidential elections is revoca-
ble by the legislature. Moreover, the court was aware that 3
U.S.C. § 2 secures for the legislature the power to appoint its own
electors when courts place those certified by the executive branch
of government in jeopardy.20 5
2. The Florida Supreme Court Extended the Deadline for Filing
Amended Voting Returns Containing the Additional Votes
Produced by Manual Recounts
Appeals by Palm Beach County and Gore to the Florida Su-
preme Court presented a difficult question: must the Secretary of
State and the Elections Canvassing Commission ("Commis-
sion")20 6 accept the results of manual recounts received after No-
vember 14-the deadline set forth in sections 102.111 and
102.112 of the Florida Statutes?0 7 Section 102.111(1) provides in
part:
The Elections Canvassing Commission shall, as soon as the official
results are compiled from all counties, certify the returns of the elec-
tion and determine and declare who has been elected for each of-
fice.... If the county returns are not received by the Department of
recognize an otherwise valid exercise of the right of a citizen to vote for the sake of sacred,
unyielding adherence to statutory scripture, we would in effect nullify that right." Harris
1, 772 So. 2d at 1228 (quoting Boardman v. Esteva, 323 So. 2d 259, 263 (Fla. 1975)).
2046 Bush I, 121 S. Ct. at 474 (emphasis added).
205. See 3 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). For the text of 3 U.S.C. § 2, see supra note 68.
In Bush I, the Supreme Court pointed out that "'[Art. II, § 1, cl. 2] does not read that
the people or the citizens shall appoint [electors], but that 'each state shall'... 'in such
manner as the legislature thereof may direct' .... .'" Bush I, 121 S. Ct. at 474 (quoting
McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 25 (1892)) (first alteration in original).
206. The functions of the Florida Elections Canvassing Commission, whose members
include the Governor (who recused himself because his brother was a candidate for Presi-
dent), the Secretary of State, and the Director of the Division of Elections, are to certify
the results of an election and to declare the winner. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.111(1) (West
Curn. Supp. 2001); see also Harris I, 772 So. 2d at 1233 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.111
(West Cum. Supp. 2000)).
207. Harris I, 772 So. 2d at 1228. The Florida court extended the deadline to Novem-
ber 26. Id. at 1240. The court reached this conclusion although neither section 102.111
nor section 102.112 of the Florida Statutes appears to require the Secretary and the
Commission to extend the deadline. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 102.111, 102.112 (West Cum.
Supp. 2001).
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State by 5 p.m. of the seventh day following an election, all missing
counties shall be ignored, and the results shown by the returns on
file shall be certified.2 °8
Section 102.112, entitled "Deadline for submission of county re-
turns to the Department of State; penalties," directs the county
canvassing boards to file their returns for the election of a federal
or state officer with the Department of State immediately after
the certification of election returns.0 9 It also provides that
"[r]eturns must be filed by 5 p.m. on the 7th day following the...
general election .... If the returns are not received by the de-
partment by the time specified, such returns may be ignored and
the results on file at that time may be certified by the depart-
ment.
210
The Florida Supreme Court discerned a conflict, noting that
"[w]hereas section 102.111 is mandatory, section 102.112 is per-
missive."21 This dichotomy was dubbed by the court as "The
'Shall' and 'May' Conflict."212 After seeking guidance from other
sections of the Election Code and the Florida Constitution, the
court held that the Secretary lacked the authority to reject the
late returns.1 3 The court pointed out that section 102.112(2) im-
poses penalties (fines) on canvassing board members who "en-
gag[e] in dilatory conduct... that results in the late certification
of a county's returns."24 The court inferred that the statutory
penalty provided the only deterrent intended by the legislature,
and that the Secretary's decision to ignore the late certification
"punishe[d] not the Board members themselves but rather the
county's electors [meaning voters], for it in effect disenfran-
chise[d] them."215
The court discerned in the penumbra of the two statutes the
following unstated rule: The Secretary has discretion to ignore
late returns if, and only if, by doing so she either (1) precludes
persons from contesting the certification when she finds that a
canvassing board's late filing shortens the contest period, or (2)
208. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.111(1) (West Cum. Supp. 2001) (emphasis added).
209. Id. § 102.112(1).
210. Id. (emphasis added).
211. Harris I, 772 So. 2d at 1233-34.
212. Id. at 1233.
213. Id. at 1236-37.
214. Id. at 1237.
215. Id.
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when such delay precludes voters from "participating fully in the
electoral process." 216 In short, the court inventively construed one
statute stating that the Secretary shall ignore late returns and
another indicating she may ignore late returns into the com-
mandment, "Thou Shalt Not Ignore Late Returns (until Novem-
ber 26)."
The court accomplished this miracle mutation by bringing into
play sections 101.5614(5) and 101.5614(6). The court stated:
Sections 101.5614(5) and (6) also support the proposition that the
"error in vote tabulation" encompasses more than a mere determina-
tion of whether the vote tabulation is functioning. Section
101.5614(5) provides that "[n]o vote shall be declared invalid or void
if there is a clear indication of the intent of the voter as determined
by the canvassing board." Conversely, section 101.5614(6) provides
that any vote in which the Board cannot discern the intent of the
voter must be discarded. Taken together these sections suggest that
"error in the vote tabulation" includes errors in the failure of the
voting machinery to read a ballot and not simply errors resulting
from the voting machinery.
217
The court's interpretation of an "error in vote tabulation" was
unprecedented, and cannot be harmonized with several other
provisions of the Election Code. For example, the term "tabula-
tion" is used in the context of equipment in Section 101.5603.218
Moreover, section 101.5606(3) states that "automatic tabulating
equipment will be set to reject all votes" under certain circum-
stances.2 9 Furthermore, section 101.5607(1)(b) states that "the
supervisor of elections [in each county] shall send by certified
mail to the Department of State a copy of the tabulation program
which was used in the logic and accuracy testing."2 0 Another
relevant section of the Election Code, section 101.5612, states
that "the supervisor of elections shall have the automatic tabu-
lating equipment tested to ascertain that the equipment will cor-
rectly tabulate the votes."22' These provisions all support the Di-
vision of Elections' advisory opinion, which adopted an objective
216. Id. The opinion cites obliquely 3 U.S.C. §§ 1-10. Id. at 1237 n.55.
217. Id. at 1229.
218. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.5603 (West Cum. Supp. 2001) (defining automatic tabulat-
ing equipment).
219. Id. § 101.5606(3).
220. Id. § 101.5607(l)(b).
221. Id. § 101.5612(1).
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interpretation (voting machine-equipment-software).222
The court relied on section 102.166 to resolve the conflict be-
tween section 102.111 (the "shall" section of the Election Code)
and section 102.112 (the "may" section of the Election Code).223
This section provides, inter alia, "that a candidate, political com-
mittee, or political party may request a manual recount any time
before the County Canvassing Board certifies the results to the
Department [of State] and, if the initial recount indicates a sig-
nificant error, the Board 'shall' conduct a countywide manual re-
count in certain cases."224 Relying on this language, the court rea-
soned that if a manual recount was filed on the sixth day
following the election (in this case November 13), there would not
be enough time to complete the recount if returns were due only
one day after the request (November 14).225 A court demanding
such a quick turnaround would be rendering a nonsensical inter-
pretation of section 102.166. This is why the Division of Elections
and the Florida Secretary of State concluded that the applicable
legislation requires an objective model, since an equipment mal-
function could probably be fixed in one day, whereas a recount
may take more than a week to complete.226
The irony of Gore's Pyrrhic victory in the Florida Supreme
Court is that his success in lengthening the protest phase short-
ened the contest phase, a mistake that may have cost him the
election. Gore would have been better off if the court had not
heeded his plea for more time. Had it not, the contest period could
have begun on November 15, and there may have been time to
complete the manual recounts.
The court could also have helped Gore by extending the dead-
line from November 14 to November 18, instead of extending it to
November 26. Federal law delayed certification until November
18, the date absentee ballots and late returns were submitted by
the canvassing boards.227 Inspired by some unknown equitable
222. See supra notes 175-82 and accompanying text
223. Harris I, 772 So. 2d at 1228-29.
224. Id. at 1235 (paraphrasing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166 (West Cure. Supp. 2000)).
225. See id.
226. Cf. Brief on the Merits of Respondents Katherine Harris et al. at 13 n.7, Bush I,
121 S. Ct. 471 (2000) (No. 00-836) ("By expanding the rights created by the legislature in
this manner, the court created the very conflict it sought to resolve-the fact that manual
recounts cannot always be completed in seven days.").
227. The Florida Supreme Court referred to a federal consent decree, federal law, a sec-
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principle, the court, instead, selected November 26. The Supreme
Court was confused by the court's explanation and remanded the
case back to the state court for a clarification of its reasoning.
28
C. The Postcertification Contest Initiated by Gore
On November 26, pursuant to Harris I, the Secretary of State
and the Election Canvassing Commission certified the amended
returns and declared Bush as the winner in Florida.229 On No-
vember 27, Gore filed a complaint contesting the certification.3 °
Time was Gore's primary enemy, as two weeks later the safe har-
bor privilege would expire.
There are many legally significant, as well as time-consuming,
differences between a postelection contest and a precertification
protest. During the protest period, canvassing boards respond to
requests for manual recounts informally, and there are no trial
type procedures.231' A contest, however, is litigation. An eviden-
tiary hearing is held immediately if the complaint sets forth the
grounds specified in section 102.168(3)(a)-(e).232 If the plaintiff-
contestant successfully carries his burden of proof, the circuit
court judge is empowered to "fashion such orders as he or she
deems necessary to ensure that each allegation in the complaint
is investigated, examined, or checked, to prevent or correct any
alleged wrong, and to provide any relief appropriate under such
circumstances."2 3 In a contest, the circuit court judge takes into
account the impact of any perceived irregularities on the state-
wide results. 4 Protests, in contrast, are limited to voting dis-
crepancies occurring in the county where a manual recount is re-
quested.23 5 No evidence is required from the party requesting a
tion of the Election Code, and an administrative regulation requiring the Secretary to de-
lay certification of official results until the counties have received absentee ballots from
citizens overseas, which in this case made the official certification date November 18. Har-
ris 1, 772 So. 2d at 1235 n.47 (citing FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 1S-2.013 (1998)).
228. Bush I, 121 S. Ct. 471, 474-75 (2000) (per curiam).
229. Harris II, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1247 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
230. Complaint to Contest Election, Gore v. Harris (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 4, 2000) (No. 00-
2808).
231. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.166 (West Cun. Supp. 2001).
232. See id. § 102.168(7).
233. Id. § 102.168(8).
234. See id. § 102.168.
235. See id. § 102.166(1).
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manual recount during the protest period.236 On the other hand, a
petitioner contesting an election must produce evidence proving:
(a) misconduct, fraud, or corruption, (b) ineligibility of the win-
ning candidate, (c) receipt of a number of illegal votes or rejection
of a number of legal votes sufficient to change or place in doubt
the result of the election, (d) bribery of an elector, election official
or canvassing board member, or (e) any other allegation which
would show that the contestant is entitled to the office.3 7 Gore at-
tempted to prove (c) rather than (a), (b), (d), or (e)."
D. Gore's Allegations
Gore and Joseph I. Lieberman alleged that the Miami-Dade
County Canvassing Board ("Miami-Dade Board") abused its dis-
cretion by refusing to complete and certify the results of the
manual recount begun during the protest period on November
19.239 Certifying the results of the partial recount would have
yielded Gore a net gain of 168 votes."4 Gore also sought injunc-
tive relief requiring the Miami-Dade Board to start counting the
9000 uncounted undervotes.24
Gore sought similar relief against the Palm Beach County
Canvassing Board ("Palm Beach Board").242 Its partial recount,
never certified, would have given Gore a 215 vote net gain.24 In
addition, there were 3300 ballots actually counted in Palm Beach
County that were not included in its certification because the
ballots were indented or dimpled and did not comply with the
standard then applicable in the county.2" Gore claimed that the
236. See id. § 102.166(4).
237. Id. § 102.168(3)(a)-(e).
238. Harris II, 772 So. 2d at 1247.
239. Id. at 1248.
240. Id. at 1258.
241. Id. When the Miami-Dade Board stopped counting, 9000 of the 10,750 undervotes
remained unreviewed. Id.
242. Id. at 1248.
243. Id. at 1260; Complaint to Contest Election I 3(a), Gore v. Harris (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec.
4, 2000) (No. 00-2808).
244. Harris II, 772 So. 2d at 1248; see also Complaint to Contest Election 81, Gore v.
Harris (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 4, 2000) (No. 00-2808). The Complaint alleged that:
The Palm Beach Board failed to count numerous votes cast for presiden-
tial candidates .... For example, the Palm Beach Board failed to count nu-
merous votes cast by voters whose ballots contained an incompletely punched
or indented chad in the first column. These ballots have been segregated and
preserved for judicial review.
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Palm Beach Board abused its discretion by violating a court order
requiring those ballots to be examined under a more forgiving
standard. 5
The Nassau County Canvassing Board ("Nassau Board") alleg-
edly abused its discretion by certifying its original machine count,
even though the automatic machine recount yielded fifty-one
more votes for Gore.' Gore sought an order compelling the Nas-
sau Board to amend its certification.'
E. Gore Loses Ground in the Lower Court
Gore did not prevail in the Leon County Circuit Court.' s Judge
N. Sanders Sauls found "that the Plaintiff failed to carry the req-
uisite burden of proof ... , 9 According to Judge Sauls, the plain-
tiffs burden of proof in a contest was not merely to produce evi-
dence that demonstrates a reasonable possibility that election
returns could have been altered."' Instead, the evidence must
demonstrate a reasonable probability that the election returns
would have been changed but for the alleged irregularities and
inaccuracies.25' Judge Sauls deemed the plaintiffs credible and
substantial evidence, statistical and otherwise, totally inade-
quate.2
52
Judge Sauls concluded that discretionary decisions of the can-
vassing boards are not subject to de novo review by the circuit
courts.253 In Judge Sauls's view, "[t]he local boards have been
given broad discretion which no court may overrule, absent a
clear abuse of discretion."254 More specifically, Judge Sauls con-
cluded that neither the Miami-Dade Board nor the Palm Beach
Board abused its discretion by refusing to amend its certifications
245. See Harris II, 772 So. 2d at 1259.
246. See id. at 1248; Complaint to Contest Election I 3(b), Gore v. Harris (Fla. Cir. Ct.
Dec. 4, 2000) (No. 00-2808).
247. Harris II, 772 So. 2d at 1248.
248. Id. at 1243.
249. Transcript of Oral Ruling at 0013, Gore v. Harris (Fla. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 2000) (No.
00-2808) (on file with author).
250. Id. at 0009.
25L Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 0010.
254 Id.
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to include partial and late returns. 5 Judge Sauls stated:
[T]here is no authority under Florida law or [sic] certification of an
incomplete manual recount of a portion of, or less than all ballots
from any county by the state elections canvassing commission, nor
any authority to include any returns submitted past the deadline es-
tablished by the Florida Supreme Court in this election.
25 6
Judge Sauls found that "although the record show[ed] voter er-
ror, and/or, less than total accuracy, in regard to the punchcard
voting devices utilized in [Miami-]Dade and Palm Beach Coun-
ties... these.., problems cannot support.., any recounting...
absent the establishment of a reasonable probability that the
statewide election would be different .... ,,2" Although plaintiffs
claimed that the Palm Beach Board violated a court ruling when
it did not count dimpled and indented ballots as legal votes,
Judge Sauls ruled that the Board acted in full compliance with
the circuit court order during its manual recount.258
Judge Sauls volunteered some words of caution to the court
that would be reviewing his decision, stating that the counting
standard proposed by Gore was "perhaps contrary to Title III,
Section (5) of the United States Code."259 He reasoned that the
standard proposed by Gore would create a "two-tier situation"
that would treat voters differently depending on where they
lived.26° According to Judge Sauls, a two-tier system of counting
votes (one that allowed counties selected by Gore to apply a more
liberal standard than other counties) placed the state's electors in
jeopardy.26' Immediately after the circuit court's ruling was an-
nounced, David Boies, Gore's attorney, said: "They won. We lost.
We're appealing. This is going to be resolved by the Florida Su-
preme Court promptly, and what I think is that that will be the
end of the matter."262
255. Id. at 0010.
256. Id. at 0009-10.
257. Id. at 0010.
258. Id. at 0011.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 0012 (reasoning that under the United States and Florida Constitutions,
Florida's electors could potentially be disqualified, thereby barring the state from the elec-
toral college's election of the President).
262. Robert B. Schmitt et al., No Contest: State Court Deals Blow to Al Gore's Hopes for
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F. The Florida Supreme Court's Decision in Harris II
1. Summary of the Florida Supreme Court's Remedy to Alleviate
the Canvassing Board's Abuse of Discretion
According to conventional wisdom, Judge Sauls made it virtu-
ally impossible for the Florida Supreme Court to overrule his de-
cision. To do so, the court would seemingly have to reverse its
prior position that "[t]he decision whether to conduct a manual
recount is vested in the sound discretion of the [Canvassing]
Board[s]. " 263 The court would also have to conclude that Judge
Sauls's findings of fact were clearly erroneous and that he abused
his discretion. Moreover, the issues posed by 3 U.S.C § 5 ap-
peared difficult to evade. Finally, as Judge Sauls observed, Equal
Protection Clause problems flawed the two-tier system of manual
recounts authorized by the court in Harris L26
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling
that denied the relief Gore sought from the Nassau Board.26 5 It
also upheld the trial court's refusal to compel the Palm Beach
Board to review and recount 3300 votes that were not counted be-
cause the punch card was merely indented.266
Nonetheless, Gore obtained what he needed to keep hope alive.
By a four-to-three vote, the court instructed a circuit court judge
to (1) begin an immediate manual recount of 9000 plus Miami-
Dade undervotes, (2) order a manual recount of undervotes in any
county where such recounts had not yet occurred, (3) devise pro-
cedures to facilitate the counting teams' efforts to ascertain the
clear intent of the voter, and (4) enter orders to add to the total
statewide certifications additional legal votes for Gore from Palm
Beach County "and the 168 additional legal votes from Miami-
Dade County."26"
the White House, WALL ST. J., Dec. 5, 2000, at A14.
263. Harris I, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1229 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
264. See supra text accompanying note 261.
265. Harris II, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1248 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
266. Id. The Supreme Court did not discuss the Florida Supreme Court's disposition of
these matters. See Bush II, 121 S. Ct. 525, 527 (2000) (per curiam).
267. Harris II, 772 So. 2d at 1262. The Florida court required the canvassing boards to
use the clear intent of the voter standard as set forth in section 101.5614(5) of the Florida
Statutes to determine whether a ballot is a legal vote. Id.
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Gore's first words to his aides were: "This is great."26 ' On the
other side of the fence, the stunned Chief of Staff for the Republi-
can National Committee stated: 'We're moving out of a political
crisis into a constitutional crisis, with very likely competing
slates of electors."269
2. The Future According to the Morning Newspapers
The day after the Florida Supreme Court revived Gore's hopes
the front page of the New York Times, in five columns, explained
the possible consequences of the decision.' The Florida legisla-
ture would, on or about December 13, appoint a slate of Bush
electors due to its apprehension that the House of Representa-
tives and Senate would reject Florida's previously certified slate
of electors that would probably not be protected by the safe har-
bor privilege.2 ' If the House voted along party lines, a narrow
majority would count the votes of the Bush electors. 2 If the Sen-
ate voted along party lines, there would be a fifty-fifty tie vote
that would place Gore in the position to cast the deciding vote. 3
If neither slate of Florida's electors was counted, Congress would
decide whether Gore's 267 electors (three less than a majority if
the votes of all 538 electors were counted) was a majority. If 270
electoral votes were required by Congress, the House of Repre-
sentatives would elect the next President. 74 Each state delega-
tion would cast one vote. 5 In the House of Representatives,
twenty-eight state delegations were Republican dominated; thus,
a party line vote would elect Bush. 6
If these media projections had been accurate, a Bush presi-
dency would have been stigmatized as "stolen" because Gore not
268. Katharine Q. Seelye, A Miraculous Revival Brings Elation but No Rest for Gore,
N.Y. TIES, Dec. 9, 2000, at Al.
269. Richard L. Berke, Stunned Republicans Vow Fight to End, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9,
2000, at Al.
270. See What if Florida Winds Up With Two Sets of Electors?, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 9,
2000, at Al.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
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only had more electoral votes, but he arguably won the popular
vote in Florida. The immediate. future looked bleak to Chief Jus-
tice Wells, whose dissent in Harris II stated that "the prolonging
of judicial process in this counting contest propels this country
and this state into an unprecedented and unnecessary constitu-
tional crisis. I have to conclude that there is a real and present
likelihood that this constitutional crisis will do substantial dam-
age to our country.... "2' The crisis was averted. On January 1,
2001, Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his annual report to Congress
stated that "[diespite the seesaw aftermath of the Presidential
election, we are once again witnessing an orderly transition of
power from one Presidential administration to another."27"
The following subsections of this article examine critically the
Florida Supreme Court's decision. Subsection 3 addresses the
state court's failure to include overvotes in the statewide recount.
Subsection 4 argues that the Florida Supreme Court miscon-
strued and misapplied section 101.5614(5) and section 102.168 of
the Florida Statutes.7 9
3. The Florida Supreme Court's Order of a Statewide Recount of
Undervotes
The Florida Supreme Court directed the Leon County Circuit
Court to order appropriate officials "in all counties that have not
conducted a manual recount or tabulation of the undervotes in
this election to do so forthwith, said tabulation to take place in
the individual counties where the ballots are located."280 The
court's justification for this directive, at best, contains inconsis-
tent principles. According to the court, it was "absolutely essen-
tial" under the statutory scheme established by the Florida Leg-
islature to count every vote unless it was "'impossible to
277. Harris II, 772 So. 2d at 1263 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
278. 2000 Year-End Report of the Federal Judiciary, available at httpjAvvw.supreme
courtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2000year-endreport.html (last modified Jan. 2, 2001).
279. See Harris II, 772 So. 2d at 1262 (discussing these statutory sections).
280. Id. Noting that pursuant to section 102.168(5) of the Florida Statutes, the circuit
court is vested with broad discretion to "provide any relief appropriate under the circum-
stances," the Florida Supreme Court delegated to the circuit court the duty of filling in the
details and administering the manual recounts. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(8)
(West Cure. Supp. 2000)).
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determine the elector's [meaning voter's] choice."'"'" The major-
ity's order, however, did not direct the canvassing boards to count
every vote.28 2
The court relied, in part, on section 102.168, which lists the
grounds providing a legal basis for a cause of action (that is, a
contest),283 and cited specifically subsections 101.5614(5)-(6)
which articulate a clear indication of the voter intent standard.2
However, the supreme court did not direct the circuit court to or-
der a statewide recount of overvotes, despite the fact that as
many as 110,000 overvotes were never counted.285
The court's refusal to recount overvotes is inconsistent with its
principle that the "outcome of elections [should] be determined by
the will of the voters."28 6 Indeed, the majority's exclusion of ap-
proximately 110,000 overvotes is inexplicable in view of its fre-
quently emphasized "concern that not every citizen's vote was
counted" by the voting machines.28 7
The court never bothered to explain its under-inclusive distinc-
tion. Instead, the majority completely ignored Chief Justice
Wells's pertinent question: "How about the 'over-votes?' 288 Chief
Justice Wells's critique of the majority opinion was provocative
enough to deserve a response. The Chief Justice wrote:
Section 101.5614(6) provides that a ballot should not be counted "[i]f
an elector marks more names than there are persons to be elected to
an office," meaning the voter voted for more than one person as
president. The underlying premise of the majority's rationale is that
in such a close race a manual review of the ballots rejected by the
machines is necessary to ensure that all legal votes cast are counted.
The majority, however, ignores the over-votes. Could it be said,
without reviewing the over-votes, that the machine did not err in not
counting them?
281. See id. at 1253-54 (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 102.5614(5)-(6), 102.166(7) (West
Cum. Supp. 2000).
282. See id. at 1262 (discussing the counting of undervotes).
283. Id. at 1253. Section 102.168(3)(c) provides, in part, that a ground for a contest in-
cludes the "rejection of a number of legal votes sufficient to change or place in doubt the
result of the election." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168(3)(c) (West Cum. Supp. 2001).
284. Harris II, 772 So. 2d at 1254.
285. Bush II, 121 S. Ct. 525, 531 (2000) (per curiam).
286. Harris 11, 772 So. 2d at 1253.
287. Id.
288. Id. at 1264 n.26 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
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It seems patently erroneous to me to assume that the vote count-
ing machine can err when reading under-votes but not err when
reading over-votes. Can the majority say, without having the over-
votes looked at, that there are no legal votes among the over-
VoteS?
2 89
The answer to Chief Justice Wells's question is: "No."
The court's exclusion of overvotes changed the law as it existed
on election day.29 Although, as the majority asserts, the Election
Code requires courts to protect the right of every voter "to select
the electors for President and Vice President of the United
States,"291 the Election Code makes no distinction between over-
votes and undervotes.292 The court, however, created this distinc-
tion,293 which had the effect of privileging those citizens who er-
roneously cast undervotes and disenfranchising those citizens
who cast overvotes.
The Supreme Court discerned a more fundamental flaw. The
Court pointed out that some overvotes were already recounted in
three counties prior to the Florida court's decision on December
8.294 In these counties, "the recounts... were not limited to so-
called undervotes but extended to all of the ballots."2 95 Therefore,
the Florida Supreme Court's "remedy" discriminated against citi-
zens living in different counties whose overvotes were excluded
from the manual recount it authorized.
One explanation for the Florida court's curious distinction is its
realization that, in addition to the 60,000 undervotes, approxi-
mately 110,000 overvotes also had to be processed, screened, iso-
lated, and then inspected.296 Thus, in all likelihood the recount
289. Id.
290. See Bush II, 121 S. Ct. at 536-38 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
29L Harris II, 772 So. 2d at 1253 (referencing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 103.011 (West Cum.
Supp. 2000)).
292. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 101.5614, 102.168 (West Cum. Supp. 2001).
293. See Harris II, 772 So. 2d at 1264 n.26 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
294. Bush II, 121 S. Ct. at 531.
295. Id.
296. Justice Harding explained in his dissent:
Clearly, the only remedy authorized by law would be a statewide recount of
more than 170,000 "no-vote" ballots by December 12. Even if such a recount
were possible, speed would come at the expense of accuracy, and it would be
difficult to put any faith or credibility in a vote total achieved under such
chaotic conditions. In order to undertake this unprecedented task, the major-
ity has established standards for manual recounts-a step that this Court re-
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could not have been completed before midnight on December 12.
The majority eliminated this time-consuming problem by ignoring
the overvotes that would have delayed the recount.29 7 To para-
phrase George Orwell, some votes were more equal than others.298
4. The Florida Supreme Court's Novel Definition of a Legal Vote
Eliminated a Substantial Amount of Discretion Previously
Exercised by Canvassing Boards
The Florida Supreme Court enlarged the scope of two subsec-
tions of section 101 of the Election Code to convert an improperly
cast ballot into a legal vote. 9 Section 101.5614(5) provides that
"[n]o vote shall be declared invalid or void if there is a clear indi-
cation of the intent of the voter as determined by the canvassing
board." °0 Conversely, section 101.5614(6) provides that any vote
in which the board cannot discern the intent of the voter must be
discarded.3 ' Section 102 governs the procedures of a contest,0 2
yet the Florida court borrowed from section 101 to interpret the
provision governing contests.0 3 If the court's "borrowing" changed
existing state law on election day, then it jeopardized the legisla-
ture's safe harbor privilege pursuant to 3 U.S.C. § 5.
The court held that that there were "sufficient allegations
made which, if analyzed pursuant to the proper standard, compel
the conclusion that legal votes sufficient to place in doubt the
election results have been rejected in this case [by the Miami-
Dade and Palm Beach Boards]."3°4 An allegation is one thing, but
fused to take in [Harris 1], presumably because there was no authority for
such action and nothing in the record to guide the Court in setting such stan-
dards. The same circumstances exist in this case.
Harris II, 772 So. 2d at 1272-73 (Harding, J., dissenting).
297. A recount of overvotes would have required a special screening process and the
equipment used for this purpose, and any new software developed for it, would have to be
evaluated for accuracy by the Secretary of State, as required by section 101.015 of the
Florida Statutes. See Bush II, 121 S. Ct. at 532-33.
298. GEORGE ORWELL, ANIMAL FARM 123 (Signet Classic 1954) (1946).
299. See Harris II, 772 So. 2d at 1256.
300. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.5614(5) (West Cum. Supp. 2001).
301. Id. § 101.5614(6).
302. Id. § 102.168.
303. See Harris II, 772 So. 2d at 1256 (concluding that each section demonstrates a
"legislative emphasis on discerning the voter's intent [that] is mirrored in the case
law...").
304. Id. at 1257.
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evidence to back up the allegation is quite another. The majority
relied on statistical common sense to construct a syllogism or,
more accurately, a quasi-syllogism. The major premise was that
the standard for reviewing uncounted ballots is contained in sec-
tions 101.5614(5) and 101.5614(6), which define a legal vote as a
ballot indicating the clear intent of the voter. °5 The minor prem-
ise was that the Miami-Dade Board abused its discretion when it
left uncounted 9000 undervotes. °6 From this, the court concluded
that "there can be no question that there are legal votes within
the 9,000 uncounted [Miami-Dade] votes sufficient to place the
results of this election in doubt."0" As a remedy for the Board's
abuse of discretion, the court ordered a hand recount of the 9000
ballots in Miami-Dade as a part of the statewide recount. 8
The problem with the court's reasoning is that sections
101.5614(5) and 101.5614(6) are designed to remedy a special
situation involving defective ballots discovered during the protest
period.30 9 According to Chief Justice Wells, section 101 "author-
izes the creation of a duplicate ballot where a 'ballot card.., is
damaged or defective so that it cannot properly be counted by the
automatic tabulating equipment."310 According to the legislative
history of the Florida Election Code, the subsections were de-
signed to ensure an accurate count of a properly cast ballot by a
properly working machine.311 The subsections were not designed
to justify a remedy that authorized godlike counting teams to di-
vine the intent of a voter who erroneously casts his or her ballot.
305. See id. at 1256; FLA STAT. ANN. § 101.5614(5)-(6) (West Cum. Supp. 2001).
306. Harris II, 772 So. 2d at 1258.
307. Id. at 1261.
308. Id. at 1261-62.
309. Id. at 1267 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
310. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 101.5614(5) (West Cur. Supp. 2000)).
311. According to the legislative history, the subsections in section 102 were intended
to supply a remedy only when the vote tabulating equipment or software was working im-
properly. See Response of Katherine Harris, Florida Secretary of State, Katherine Harris,
Lawrence C. Roberts, and Bob Crawford, as Members of the Florida Elections Canvassing
Commission, to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13 & 13-14 n.10, Bush I, 121 S. Ct. 471
(2000) (No. 00-836). For example, there had been a problem in a prior election in which
"an apparent software 'glitch' or error was responsible for an incident in Ft. Pierce when a
machine would count the Democratic votes, but would not accept Republican ones." Id.
(citing STATE OF FLA. ETHICS AND ELECTIONS COM., SENATE AND STAFF ANALYSIS AND
EcONohnc IMPACT STATEMENT, CS/SB 499 (1999)). Before legislation was enacted to cope
with these problems, there were also other "horror stories" relating to electronic voting
systems. Id
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In short, the subsections were enacted to cope with machine er-
ror, not voter error.1 2
According to Justice Harding, who was joined by Justice Shaw,
"the majority has established [new] standards for manual re-
counts-a step that this Court refused to take in [Harris 1] pre-
sumably because there was no authority for such action and
nothing in the record to guide the Court in setting such stan-
dards."313
Arguing on behalf of Gore, a lawyer representing Florida's At-
torney General candidly admitted that "never before the [2000
presidential] election had a manual recount been conducted on
the basis of the contention that 'undervotes' should have been ex-
amined to determine voter intent."314 According to the three con-
curring Justices in Bush II, this concession was strong testimony
indicating that the Florida Supreme Court departed from the
Election Code enacted by the legislature. 5
The Florida court's decision ordering the Miami-Dade Board to
count undervotes that were not counted due to a lack of time is
also questionable. The recount was never completed because the
Miami-Dade Board, exercising its discretion, decided that it could
not be finished before the November 26 deadline established in
Harris ."6 In Harris II, however, the Miami-Dade Board learned
that the November 26 "deadline was never intended to prohibit
legal votes identified after that date through ongoing manual re-
counts to be excluded from the statewide official results. ,317
Therefore, the court ordered the Miami-Dade and Palm Beach
Boards to amend the certificates each had submitted on Novem-
ber 26, resulting in a net gain of 383 votes for Gore.318
The Florida court's reasoning concerned Chief Justice
Rehnquist. He noted that in Harris I the court extended the certi-
312. See supra notes 170-93 (comparing the views of Florida's Division of Elections,
Secretary of State, Attorney General, and the Florida Supreme Court).
313. Harris II, 772 So. 2d at 1273 (Harding, J., dissenting).
314. Bush II, 121 S. Ct. 525, 538 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citing Transcript
of Oral Argument, Bush I, 121 S. Ct. 471 (Dec. 1, 2000) (No. 00-836), available at 2000 WL
1763666, at *39-40)).
315. See id. (noting that for the court "to step away from this established practice...
was to depart from the legislative scheme").
316. See Harris II, 772 So. 2d at 1267 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
317. Id. at 1260 (per curiam).
318. Id. at 1262.
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fication deadline established by the legislature presumably be-
cause "certification was a matter of significance."319 In contrast to
this earlier reasoning, the Chief Justice observed that "the [Flor-
ida] court emptie[d] certification of virtually all legal conse-
quences during the contest, and in doing so depart[ed] from the
provisions enacted by the Florida Legislature" by holding "that all
late vote talies... should be automatically included in the certi-
fication regardless of the certification deadline ... 320
Chief Justice Rehnquist was also concerned with the manner in
which the Florida court mishandled the safe harbor problem in
Harris II. The Florida court had concluded that federal law
"[n]otwithstanding, [and] consistent with the legislative mandate
and [the court's] precedent, although the time constraints are
limited, [the court] must do everything required by [state] law to
ensure that legal votes that have not been counted are included
in the final election results."21 As will be discussed, this subordi-
nation of federal law did not please the Chief Justice.
5. Chief Justice Rehnquist's Analysis of Harris 11 in Light of
Article II of the U.S. Constitution
The Chief Justice prefaced his analysis of the Florida Supreme
Court's decision with the following statement:
In most cases, comity and respect for federalism compel us to de-
fer to the decisions of state courts on issues of state law .... Of
course, in ordinary cases, the distribution of powers among the
branches of a State's government raises no question of federal consti-
tutional law .... But there are a few exceptional cases in which the
Constitution imposes a duty or confers a power on a particular
branch of a State's government. This is one of them. Article II, § 1, cl.
2, provides that "[elach State shall appoint, in such Manner as the
Legislature thereof may direct," electors for President and Vice
President.
322
319. Bush II, 121 S. Ct. at 536-37 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice
Rehnquist also noted that Chief Justice Wells, in his dissent in Harris II, pointed out that
section 101.5614(5) is "entirely irrelevant." Id. at 538.
320. Id, at 537.
321 Harris II, 772 So. 2d at 1261. The court indicated that "practical difficulties may
well end up controlling the outcome of the election." Id. at 1262 n.21. This could have
meant that the contest period might well have extended beyond December 12, or it could
have meant that any legal votes found during the partial recounts would have been certi-
fied even if the manual recount could not be completed.
322. Bush II, 121 S. Ct. at 534 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (quoting U.S. CONST. art.
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The Chief Justice concluded that the text of a state's election
law itself, and not just its interpretation by the courts of the
state, takes on independent significance. 23 Having laid the
groundwork for an unusual departure from the Court's tradi-
tional position, the Chief Justice wrote: "Though we generally de-
fer to state courts on the interpretation of state law.., there are
of course areas in which the Constitution requires this Court to
undertake an independent, if still deferential, analysis of state
law."324 In presidential elections, deference to the state supreme
court's interpretations of state law "would be to abdicate our re-
sponsibility to enforce the explicit requirements of Article II." 25
According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court's responsibility
for a more careful review of the Florida court's interpretation of
state law was the critical issue, because the preservation of the
electors' safe harbor depended on "whether the [Florida court's
definition of a legal vote] ha[d] actually departed from the statu-
tory meaning." ' Chief Justice Rehnquist then argued that Arti-
cle II authorizes the Court to deviate from its usual canons of fed-
eralism, comity, and equity in order to preserve the Article II
authority granted by Congress to the state legislatures. 327 This
view, while debatable, is a fair reading of Article II and a fair
summary of McPherson v. Blacker,$23 a venerable case in which
the Court unanimously agreed that Article II "leaves it to the
legislature exclusively to define the method of [an elector's ap-
pointment] .329
Having concluded that the state court's interpretation of sec-
tions 101.5614(5) and 101.5614(6) "emptie[d] certification of vir-
tually all legal consequences,"3 ° the Chief Justice further ex-
plained that the December 8 court order, compelling the Palm
Beach and Miami-Dade Boards to amend their certificates (sub-
mitted by November 26), usurped authority given to the Secre-
tary of State by the Florida Legislature. 3 ' The Chief Justice re-
H, § 1, cl. 2).
323. Id.
324. Id. at 535.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 535-36.
328. 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
329. Id. at 27.
330. Bush II, 121 S. Ct. at 537 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
331. Id.
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marked that the Florida court's conclusion that a legal vote in-
cluded those ballots that were not counted by a properly func-
tioning machine due to the failure of the voter to follow instruc-
tions was "of course absurd."332 The recounting "of tens of
thousands of so-called 'undervotes' spread though 64 of the
State's 67 counties," was inappropriate under section
102.168(3)(c) because it "authorized open-ended further proceed-
ings which could not be completed by December 12. This was
so, even though the Florida court itself recognized the legisla-
ture's intention "to bring Florida within the 'safe harbor' provi-
sion of 3 U.S.C § 5 ...."3 For Chief Justice Rehnquist, the bot-
tom line was this: "If we are to respect the legislature's Article II
powers.., we must ensure that postelection state-court [inter-
pretations of state law] do not frustrate the legislative desire to
attain the 'safe harbor' provided by § 5. "335
In response to the dissenters' attacks on his independent
analysis of a state court's interpretation of state law, 36 the Chief
Justice stated that "[t]his inquiry does not imply a disrespect for
state courts but rather a respect for the constitutionally pre-
scribed role of state legislatures."337
332. Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist, seemingly exasperated by the Florida Supreme
Coures reasoning stated that "[i]t is inconceivable that what constitutes a vote that must
be counted under the 'error in the vote tabulation' language of the protest phase is differ-
ent from what constitutes a vote that must be counted under the 'legal votes' language of
the contest phase." Id. at 537 n.4.
333. Id. at 538, 539.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 534.
336. Id. at 539-40 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 543-44 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at
546-50 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); id. at 552-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
337. Id. at 535 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
Although Justice O'Connor did not join Chief Justice Rehnquist's concurring opinion,
during oral argument in Bush II she asked David Boies, Gore's lawyer, whether a state
court interpreting a state provision governing contest of presidential elections must "give
special deference to the legislature's choices [concerning the § 5 safe harbor] insofar as a
presidential election is concerned?" Transcript of Oral Argument, Bush II, 121 S. Ct. 525
(2000) (No. 00-949), available at 2000 WL 1804429, at *43. Boies responded that the Flor-
ida Supreme Court's interpretation of the contest provision was "within the normal ambit
of judicial interpretation" of a statute. Id. Justice O'Connor was perplexed. She replied:
"You are responding as though there was no special burden [for state courts] to show some
deference to legislative choices. In this [presidential] context... in the context of selection
of presidential electors, isn't there a big red flag up there [signifying] watch out?" Id. at
*43-44. In short, during the oral argument, Justice O'Connor did not see Bush II as a gar-
den-variety case involving pure state law since state and federal law were inextricably en-
twined. See id. at *37-44.
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The four dissenters in Bush II vigorously challenged the Chief
Justice's claim that the Florida court impermissibly distorted the
provisions of the Election Code. They argued, as had Gore, that
the court merely interpreted, rather than changed, state law.338
Justice Souter admitted that section 101.5614(5) deals with
"damaged and defective ballots," that the Florida Supreme
Court's "majority might have chosen a different meaning," and
that a "different reading ... is possible."339 However, Justice
Souter did not think that the court's interpretation changed state
law in violation of Article II, Section 1, Clause 2.340 As to the safe
harbor problem, Justice Souter optimistically believed that Con-
gress could handle it under 3 U.S.C § 15, 34 an optimism that was
not shared by the Florida legislature. 42
Justice Breyer's dissent defended the state court's interpreta-
tion of Florida law. Although he conceded that section
101.5614(5) is "a provision that addresses damaged or defective
ballots,"3 43 he rejected the conclusion that the Florida Supreme
Court may not use that subsection to define the meaning of a le-
gal vote-even when ballots are not damaged or defective. 3" Jus-
Justice Kennedy, who also did not join in the concurring opinion, helped make Chief
Justice Rehnquist's views more credible by asking Boies some probing questions during
oral argument. For example, he asked whether it would violate federal law if, after the
November 7 election, Florida's legislature had changed deadlines and allowed for selective
recounts in contests. Id. at *39-40. Boies replied, "I think that would be unusual. I haven't
really thought about the question." Id. at *40. Regaining his composure, Boies added that
it would be contrary to federal law for the Florida legislature to have done what the Flor-
ida Supreme Court did because that "would be a legislative enactment as opposed to a ju-
dicial interpretation of an existing law." Id. This answer by Boies suggests that the Flor-
ida Supreme Court complies with federal law so long as state laws (dealing with defective
ballots) can be expanded by judges to protect what the court perceives is the legislature's
intention to delegate the selection of the President to the people. But if the expansion dis-
torts the legislative intent indicated in a particular subsection that is designed only for
defective ballots and ballots damaged by a malfunctioning machine, Boies' argument is not
convincing. For a transcript of the Oral Argument in Bush I that identifies each speaker,
see Contesting the Vote: The Questions Before the Court, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2000, at A19.
338. See Bush II, 121 S. Ct. at 552-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Brief of Respondent Al-
bert Gore, Jr. at 11-15, Bush II, 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000) (No. 00-949).
339. Bush II, 121 S. Ct. at 544 (Souter, J., dissenting).
340. Id. at 543-44.
341. Id. at 543.
342. See FLA. LEGISLATURE, SELECT JOINT COMMITTEE ON THE MANNER OF
APPOINTMENTS OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS, at 9-10
(Dec. 4, 2000) [hereinafter COMMITTEE ON THE MANNER OF APPOINTMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTORS].
343. Bush II, 121 S. Ct. at 554 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
344. Id. at 554.
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tice Breyer claimed that no one could say that this determination
by the court was an "impermissible distortion."345 This assertion
is simply not true. If Gore had won the recount after December
12, on January 6, Congress had the authority, if not the duty, to
find that the Florida Supreme Court impermissibly required the
canvassing boards to count votes that were not legal.346
The foregoing discussion has immersed the reader in the com-
plexities of Florida law because, without doing so, it is difficult to
evaluate whether the state court's interpretation of Florida law
was correct, debatable, or, as the Chief Justice argued, "ab-
surd."347 Whether the Florida Supreme Court simply distorted the
text of the state statutes or impermissibly distorted them is an
interesting question. The point, however, is that the Chief Jus-
tice's interpretation is plausible. Most certainly, it is not "an act
no less reprehensible than the partisan resolution of the election
of 1876.""
G. The Per Curiam Opinion
1. Summary of the Supreme Court's General Approach in
Disputed Election Cases
In voting rights cases, different sets of facts take courts in dif-
ferent directions, and different levels of judicial scrutiny apply
depending on the character and magnitude of the state's depriva-
tion of a citizen's right to participate in an election. Not unlike
the scenario seen in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,349 a
case involving a poll tax,350 in Bush 11 there was no intent to dis-
criminate against any class of voters, and there was no classifica-
tion against individuals or groups of people identified by an im-
mutable trait. 5' Harper arose from a Virginia constitutional
345. Id. at 555.
346. 3 U.S.C. § 15 (1994); see supra text accompanying note 149.
347. Bush II, 121 S. Ct at 537 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
348. The Election Mess, supra note 10, at 48. The outraged historians forgot about the
overvotes when they concluded that the Court's "decision to halt the full and accurate
counting of Florida's legal votes prevents the American people from selecting the next
president of the United States." Id.
349. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
350. Id. at 664.
351. The equal protection claim raised by the petitioners in Bush 11 did not involve
"immutable traits" such as race or gender, but rather it challenged "[tihe new electoral
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provision authorizing the Commonwealth to charge between
$1.50 and $3.00 for the right to vote, regardless of whether the
citizen was poor or affluent, black or white. 52 Nevertheless, the
Court was concerned with the comparatively harsher effect of the
tax on the poor, and categorized the line drawn by Virginia as ar-
bitrary. 3 As in Harper, the disturbing element of Florida's voting
system was that it was based on arbitrarily drawn lines.
The elastic "clear intent of the voter" standard turned out to be
substantially overbroad and potentially discriminatory because it
delegated power to vote counters who were not sufficiently quali-
fied or experienced enough to determine a voter's intent from
mere marks and chads" 4 Broad delegations of power are usually
tolerated, so long as they have an intelligible principle that nar-
rows their breadth; however, "[tihe area of permissible indefi-
niteness narrows... when the [standard] ... potentially affects
fundamental rights,"355 such as voting rights and those protected
by the First Amendment. It may well be that Bush 1I will hence-
forth be limited to a unique category of presidential election
cases. Certainly, it does not fit snugly in any other particular box
of cases labeled "rational basis" 56 or "strict scrutiny."357 Instead,
the competing federal, state, and individual voter interests re-
quired the Court to strike a proper balance.
Unlike the early apportionment cases dealing with vote dilu-
tion, such as Reynolds v. Sims,35 the Court in Bush 11 was not at-
tempting to formulate a judicially manageable standard. The
Court did, however, plausibly explain why Florida's standard was
system created by the Florida Supreme Court... based on the counties or geographic re-
gions in which [voters] live ... ." Brief for Petitioners at 41, Bush II, 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000)
(No. 00-949); see also Bush II, 121 S. Ct. at 545 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("Petitioners have
raised an equal protection claim, in the charge that unjustifiably disparate standards are
applied in different electoral jurisdictions.. .. ") (emphasis added) (internal citation omit-
ted).
352. Harper, 383 U.S. at 664 n.1.
353. Id. at 668.
354 Bush II, 121 S. Ct. at 532.
355. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 275 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring).
356. See, e.g., Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (public
health); Ry. Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (local advertising
regulations).
357. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (federal affirma-
tive action programs); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (state and
local affirmative action programs).
358. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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unmanageable." 9 As discussed, the Florida Supreme Court
authorized manual recounts of undervotes,"6 ° thereby arbitrarily
excluding overvotes.36' The court did this even though the appli-
cable statute authorized canvassing boards to manually recount
all ballots.3 62 As in Harper, an arbitrary line was drawn, and it
was causing chaos. As Justice Ginsburg recently noted, "there
must be a substantial regulation of elections... if some sort of
order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic proc-
esses.'"
363
In Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party," Chief Justice
Rehnquist described the Court's discretionary approach in voting
rights cases when he wrote:
When deciding whether a state election law violates First and
Fourteenth Amendment associational rights, we weigh the "charac-
ter and magnitude" of the burden the State's rule imposes on those
rights against the interests the State contends justify that burden,
and consider the extent to which the State's concerns make the bur-
den necessary. Regulations imposing severe burdens on plaintiffs'
rights must be narrowly tailored and advance a compelling state in-
terest. Lesser burdens, however, trigger less exacting review, and a
State's "important regulatory interests" will usually be enough to
justify "reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions." No bright line
separates permissible election-related regulation from unconstitu-
tional infringements on First Amendment freedoms. ("[N]o litmus-
paper test... separat[es] those restrictions that are valid from those
that are invidious.... The rule is not self executing and is no substi-
tute for the hard judgments that must be made ).36
In Bush II, the state's interest, as conceived by the Florida Su-
preme Court, was regulatory only in a Panglossian sense. Its in-
terest was to count all the votes at the expense of the federal in-
terest in promptly resolving the dispute. Another federal interest
that the Court took seriously was that of equal protection, which
guarantees to all qualified voters an equally weighted vote. 66
359. Bush II, 121 S. Ct. at 530-32.
360. Harris II, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1262 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
36L Id. at 1264 n.26 (Wells, C.J., dissenting).
362. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 102.166(4)(d), 102.166(5)(c) (West Cum. Supp. 2001).
363. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 187 (1999) (quoting
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)).
364. 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
365. Id. at 358-59 (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
366. Bush II, 121 S. Ct. at 530-32.
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2. Reapportionment Cases Relied Upon in Bush II
Five Justices usually inclined to exercise judicial restraint in
cases involving unwritten constitutional rights held that the
standard used to count votes in Florida violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.367 My summary of their argument runs as follows:
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections36 and Reynolds v. Sims369
are applicable, as these cases protect the right to vote granted to
Florida citizens by the state legislature.37 ° In Bush II, the Court
relied on the principle that once a state grants "the right to vote
on equal terms, [it] may not, by later arbitrary and disparate
treatment, value one person's vote over that of another." 7' Ac-
cording to Harper, disparate treatment that gives more weight to
one person's vote than another's occurs when lines are drawn
which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause. 72
Quoting Reynolds, the majority in Bush II went further, stating
that "'the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilu-
tion of the weight of a citizen's vote just as effectively as by
wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.' 3 3 Since the
Florida court's standard diluted and debased the votes of Florida
citizens, and since this standard was applied arbitrarily, it could
not survive heightened scrutiny.3 4 As in both Harper and Rey-
nolds, a less probing level of scrutiny, like the rational basis test,
was deemed inappropriate. 7 ' The right of suffrage, once granted,
cannot be diluted simply because the lines drawn by the state are
rational.
One of the many ironies in Bush H is that the hyperactive
Warren Court supplied a defensible basis for a ruling that second-
guessed the judgment of a state court purporting to apply state
367. Id. at 529.
368. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
369. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
370. Cf. Harper, 383 U.S. at 665 ("[O]nce the franchise is granted to the electorate,
lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment."); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 566 (concluding "that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause guarantees the opportunity for equal participation by all voters in the election
of state legislators").
371. Bush II, 121 S. Ct. at 530 (citing Harper, 383 U.S. at 665).
372. Harper, 383 U.S. at 668.
373. Bush II, 121 S. Ct. at 530 (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555).
374. Id. at 532.
375. Id. at 530.
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law. What the Warren Court did in both Harper and Reynolds is
what the Rehnquist Court did in Bush II. The irony is that nei-
ther Harper nor Reynolds is well grounded in tradition, prece-
dent, original intent, or text, and both cases are radical depar-
tures from the manner in which equal protection principles have
been traditionally applied.376 In both cases, the dissenters' argu-
ments were stronger than the majority's, focusing on the role of
judges and their power to intervene in a domain that is tradition-
ally reserved to the state. 7
We tend to forget that the "Constitution is guilty of an embar-
rassing lapse; it contains no broad guarantee of the right to par-
ticipate in the democratic process."37 In fact, "the Constitution
appears to have treated voting rights as a matter of solely state
concern and [Article I, Section 4] permitted the states wide toler-
ance in deciding who could-and who could not-vote."7 9 There-
fore, "courts prior to the Warren [Court] era were unable-or un-
willing-to fashion broad constitutional protection of voting
rights."3 0 Nonetheless, while not supported by history, the War-
ren Court decisions articulate a desirable ideal that is consistent
with a contemporary consensus of opinion.
The hurdle for the Warren Court to overcome was the political
question doctrine, which, if applicable, would make a vote dilu-
tion case, like Bush II, nonjusticiable. For example, the political
question doctrine resulted in the dismissal of a vote dilution case
in South v. Peters.3"' That suit challenged the constitutionality of
Georgia's county unit system, a winner-take-all system that en-
abled the candidate with the most votes in each country to get
376. See Harper, 383 U.S. at 682 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[Reynolds] among its other
breaks with the past also marked a departure from... traditional and wise principle.");
Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 615 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court's decision is
"unequivocally refuted by history and by consistent theory and practice from the time of
adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment").
377. See Harper, 383 U.S. at 675-80 (Black, J., dissenting) (noting that with regard to
state laws in prior cases the Court "properly respected the limitation of its power under
the Equal Protection Clause"); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 624 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating
that the holding will result in "a radical alteration in the relationship between the States
and the Federal Government, more particularly the Federal Judiciary").
378. BURT NEUBORNE & ARTHUR EISENBERG, THE RIGHTS OF CANDIDATES AND VOTERS
13 (1980).
379. Id.
380. Id.
381. 339 U.S. 276 (1950).
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that county's full unit vote.8 2 However, some counties with large
populations had fewer unit votes than counties with small popu-
lations.8 3 The plaintiff demonstrated that a vote in one county
was valued at 120 times more than a vote in another county.3s'
The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of the suit, reasoning that
"[fiederal courts consistently refuse to exercise their equity pow-
ers in cases posing political issues arising from a state's geo-
graphical distribution of electoral strength among its political
subdivisions. "385 This outcome was not surprising in light of the
decision in Colegrove v. Green,3"6 a case involving apportionment
of congressional districts. 87
Colegrove was qualified to vote in the November 1946 congres-
sional election; however, his vote was diluted because of the way
in which the state's congressional districts were apportioned.3s
He petitioned a federal district court to prevent the scheduled
congressional election until such time as the legislature appor-
tioned the state more equitably.3 9 In a three-three-one decision,
the Court affirmed the district court's decision denying Colegrove
relief."' Justice Frankfurter, referring to the issue's "peculiarly
political nature" 9' wrote that "this controversy concerns matters
that bring courts into immediate and active relations with party
contests. From the determination of such issues this Court has
traditionally held aloof. It is hostile to a democratic system to in-
volve the judiciary in the politics of the people."392 In a famous
warning no longer heeded, Justice Frankfurter admonished fed-
eral courts not to enter the "political thicket" of reapportionment
litigation. 93
No member of the Court in Bush I or Bush II explicitly invoked
the political question doctrine,3 94 despite the Court's obvious in-
382. Id. at 277.
383. Id.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
387. Id. at 550.
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id. at 556.
391. Id. at 552.
392. Id. at 553-54.
393. Id. at 556.
394. Justice Breyer, who objected to the remand that stopped the manual recount,
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volvement in a political battle between the Republican and
Democratic parties. Therefore, in Bush II, the Rehnquist Court
entered the "political thicket" full throttle, and the five conserva-
tive Justices in the majority have, as a result, bruised reputa-
tions.395
The political question doctrine was permanently discarded in
reapportionment cases after Justice Brennan's opinion for the
Court in Baker v. Carr.39 Now, a citizen whose vote is not equally
weighted with the votes of citizens living in other counties or dis-
tricts will likely prevail if he or she seeks to enjoin a scheduled
election.3 97 Indeed, Georgia's county unit system of voting was
challenged a second time,398 this time successfully, in Gray v.
Sanders.99 The Court stated that state power may not be "used
as an instrument for circumventing a federally protected right."4"'
Justice Douglas's opinion implicitly supported a one person, one
vote standard,40 ' and Justice Stewart, concurring, explicitly
stated that "there can only be room for but a single constitutional
rule-one voter, one vote."402 This principle has since become bed-
rock doctrine. In Reynolds v. Sims, 4°3 the Court made it clear that
"the fundamental principle of representative government in this
country is one of equal representation for equal numbers of peo-
ple, without regard to ... place of residence within a State."0 4 In
made an argument based on the need for judicial restraint that resembled the political
question doctrine. See Bush II, 121 S. Ct. 525, 555-58 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
395. The Justices have been stung by the slings and arrows of outraged critics who
have accused them of acting injudiciously-owing to their zeal to protect their own agenda
from new Justices likely to be appointed by Gore. See supra notes 40-48 and accompany-
ing text.
396. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). In Baker, urban voters claimed that Tennessee's system of
apportionment enabled counties with populations as low as 2340 persons to have the same
representation in the legislature as counties having up to 33,900 persons. See id. at 255
(Clark, J., concurring). They sought a declaration that this inequality of representation
abridged their rights to equal protection of the laws. Id. at 187-88. The district court dis-
missed their complaint, but the Supreme Court reinstated the voter's lawsuit and directed
the district court to try the case. Id. at 237.
397. See infra text accompanying notes 399-404,425-27.
398. For a discussion of the first unsuccessful challenge, see supra notes 381-85 and
accompanying text.
399. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
400. Id. at 381 (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1957)).
40L See id. at 381.
402. Id. at 382 (Stewart, J., concurring).
403. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
404. Id. at 560-61. In this vein, the Court stated that "[t]he fact that a citizen lives
here or there is not a legitimate reason for overweighting or diluting the efficacy of his
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Reynolds, the Court refused to apply the rational basis test. 0 5 In-
stead, it demanded "careful judicial scrutiny" in all cases if "the
right of all of the State's citizens to cast an effective and ade-
quately weighted vote [is] unconstitutionally impaired."4 °6 One
can argue until blue in the face that no voter or voting group in
Florida was singled out for discriminatory treatment. Perhaps
that argument may have been good at one time, but the "effects"
test in Harper and the one person, one vote formula in Reynolds
are easy to remember, grasp, apply, and difficult to attack, even
now, four decades after they were injected into Equal Protection
Clause analysis. Are these reapportionment cases applicable to
Bush II? The answer is yes, even if they are not tailor-made.
3. Unequally Weighted Votes in Florida's Court-Ordered Recount
The procedures authorized by the Florida Supreme Court for
counting legal votes had several, obvious problems. As to under-
votes, the standard was to discern the clear intent of the voter,0 '
which had the effect of creating unequally weighted votes.40 8 Per-
haps a single counter could divine a voter's subjective intent by
looking at marks, scratches, holes, or bits of hanging paper; but
maybe the counter in an adjoining county (or sitting next to him
or her) could not or has a different point of view. Of course, when
reading a will, a judge interprets the testator's intent,4" 9 and
while two judges in different counties may disagree as to a testa-
tor's intent, there are interpretive canons, cases, books, rules of
construction, and qualified persons with law degrees to apply
these guides. With chads, however, there is neither an authorita-
tive guidebook, nor are there specific rules of interpretation ap-
plicable to every ballot. In Florida, many counters assigned to in-
spect ballots were untrained.410 It was not clear who could object
vote." Id. at 567.
405. Id. at 581.
406. Id.
407. Harris II, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1262 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
408. See Bush II, 121 S. Ct. 525, 530-31 (2000) (per curiam).
409. E.g., In re Marine Midland Bank, 547 N.E.2d 1152, 1153-54 (N.Y. 1989) ("Courts
construing donative instruments are governed by a threshold axiom: a testator's intent, as
ascertained 'from the words used in the will.., according to their everyday and ordinary
meaning,' reigns supreme.").
410. Bush II, 121 S. Ct. at 532.
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to a counter's decision or what a valid objection would be.4 ' Thus,
the system of counting could be fairly labeled as arbitrary and in-
consistent with the principles of equal protection. Moreover, the
system favored Gore-who had nothing to lose and the presidency
to gain by contesting the election. Notably, as the candidate certi-
fied under Florida law, Bush could not contest the election.412
The Supreme Court gladly conceded that the "intent of the
voter" standard "is unobjectionable as an abstract proposition and
as a starting principle."4 3 The problem, as the Court saw it, "in-
here[d] in the absence of specific standards to ensure its equal
application."4 4 Even Justice Souter, dissenting on other grounds,
pointed out that the rules in different counties, as applied to iden-
tical looking ballots, were different and "no legitimate state inter-
est [was] served by these differing treatments of the expressions
of voters' fundamental rights."4 5
The Court accepted the fact, but rejected the argument, that
general standards to determine the intent of an actor are common
in many areas of the law.41 It noted that in most of these situa-
tions, the applicable general standard "is not susceptible to much
further refinement."41 7 The counting teams were dealing with
ballots having "marks or holes or scratches," and they were
evaluating "a thing, not a person."418 Thus, the Court concluded
that more specific and objective rules were "practicable" and
"necessary" and must be "designed to ensure uniform treat-
ment. 419
More specific guidelines were necessary because "the standards
for accepting or rejecting contested ballots varied not only from
county to county but indeed within a single county from one re-
count team to another."42 ° Not surprisingly, the absence of specific
411. Id. at 530-32.
412. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 102.168 (West Cum. Supp. 2001).
413. Bush I1, 121 S. Ct. at 530.
414. Id.
415. Id. at 545 (Souter, J., dissenting).
416. Id. at 530 (per curiam).
417. Id.
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Id. at 531.
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rules "led to the unequal valuation of ballots" within counties and
in different counties.42'
The Court provided concrete examples of the varying standards
that were being used. First, it noted that "three members of the
[Miami-Dade] canvassing board applied different standards in de-
fining a legal vote... [and] at least one county changed its
evaluative standards during the counting process."422 The Palm
Beach Board first began the process with 1990 standards, and
then changed the law governing the counting by applying a dif-
ferent, stricter standard, and then-pursuant to an appellate
court order-started considering dimpled chads as legal votes.4'
Citing Gray v. Sanders,424 the Court concluded that these inci-
dences added up to "arbitrary and disparate treatment to voters
in... different counties."425 The Court also cited Moore v.
Oglive,426 noting that in that case the Court had "invalidated a
county-based procedure that diluted the influence of citizens [in
other counties]."42 In Bush II, the Court repeated its observation
from Moore that "[t]he idea that one group can be granted greater
voting strength than another is hostile to the one man, one vote
basis of our representative government."42 Based on this prece-
dent, the Court was well within reason to hold that the Florida
court's authorization and ratification of uneven treatment did not
comply with bedrock equal protection principles.429
The Court also noted several other violations of equal protec-
421. Id. at 530. During oral argument, Justice O'Connor asked Gore attorney David
Boies, "Well, why isn't the standard [for ascertaining legal votes] the one that voters are
instructed to follow, for goodness sake? I mean it [the instructions] couldn't be clearer."
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 337, at *58. Mr. Boies replied, "Well Your Honor,
because in Florida law since 1917, Darby against State, the Florida Supreme Court has
held that where a voter's intent can be discerned, even if they don't do what they're told,
that's supposed to be counted..." Id. The equal protection problem, however, was that the
counting teams were never informed how to discern that intent, and, therefore, what
counted as clear intent in one county was not the same in other counties.
422. Bush II, 121 S. Ct. at 531.
423. Id.
424. 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
425. Bush II, 121 S. Ct. at 531.
426. 394 U.S. 814 (1969).
427. Bush II, 121 S. Ct. at 531 (citing Moore, 394 U.S. at 819).
428. Id. (quoting Moore, 394 U.S. at 819).
429. Id. at 531. "Seven Justices of the Court agree that there are constitutional prob-
lems with the recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court that demand a remedy." Id.
at 533.
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tion principles. For example, recount totals from Miami-Dade and
Palm Beach were "included in the certified total" of votes, even
though those counties used different standards than Broward
County." In addition, those three counties counted overvotes,
whereas overvotes were excluded from all the manual recounts
authorized by the Florida Supreme Court on December 8."1
Some of the equal protection problems caused by the proce-
dures authorized by the Florida court also violated the basic re-
quirements of due process of law. For example, no one objecting to
the counting teams' decisions was permitted to object during the
recount. 2 The Court's due process concerns were not alleviated
by the fact that objections could be subsequently brought to "a
single state judicial officer." 3 In sum, the Court adequately ad-
dressed why the one person, one equally weighted vote principle
was violated by the standard authorized by the Florida Supreme
Court.
Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, argued for the application of the
Court's most deferential level of scrutiny, the rational basis test
(also known as the rubber stamp test) 4 Her argument, however,
is not in line with the holding in Reynolds, which instructs judges
to apply "careful scrutiny" in one person, one vote cases and
warns judges that "a clearly rational state policy" may fall short
of the strict standards demanded by the Equal Protection
Clause." 5
Justice Stevens admitted that "the use of differing substan-
430. Id. at 531 (noting that Broward County's standard was more "forgiving").
431. Id.; see Harris II, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1253 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam) (stating that a
manual recount should "be conducted for all legal votes in this State... in all Florida
counties where there was an undervote").
432. Bush II, 121 S. Ct. at 532.
433. Id. But see id. at 541 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that any equal protection
concerns are "alleviated-if not eliminated-by the fact that a single impartial magistrate
will ultimately adjudicate all objections arising from the recount process").
434. Id. at 549-50 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg cites McDonald v. Bd. of
Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969), a case that concerned a claim by qualified voters in
jail who wanted absentee ballots provided to other classes of persons absent from their
county of residence. Id. at 803. Commentators have described the scrutiny in this case as
"[plerhaps the most extremely deferential version of traditional equal protection criteria."
GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN SULLIVAN, CoNSTITUTIoNAL LAW 642 (13th ed. 1997).
Chief Justice Warren, writing for the Court, distinguished McDonald from cases that dealt
with the fundamental right to vote because a right to an absentee ballot was involved, not
an impact on "the fundamental right to vote." McDonald, 394 U.S. at 807.
435. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 581.
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dards for determining voter intent in different counties employing
similar voting systems may raise serious concerns." 6 These con-
cerns, he reasoned, were alleviated because there was an impar-
tial magistrate assigned to handle objections to a counting team's
decisions.43 The presence of an impartial magistrate, however,
was window dressing. The magistrate merely evaluated objec-
tions in accordance with the varying standards in each county. In
other words, the magistrate used the one corner hanging chad
standard in county X, the two corner standard in county Y, and
the indentation standard in county Z.
Justice Stevens claimed that the Court's interest in "final-
ity.., effectively order[ed] the disenfranchisement of an un-
known number of voters whose ballots reveal[ed] their intent."43
This assertion ignores the fact that it was the Florida Supreme
Court's system that created the risk that six million voters, who
cast legal votes would be disenfranchised. These voters would
also have been disenfranchised if Congress had determined that
Florida's slate of electors was unlawful.4" 9 In short, the dissents of
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg do not convincingly demonstrate
that the Court erred in holding that "the recount [could not] be
conducted in compliance with the requirements of equal protec-
tion and due process without substantial additional work." °
I. The Remand
The Court gave a terse justification for its remand, reasoning
that "Iblecause the Florida Supreme Court has said that the
Florida Legislature intended to obtain the safe harbor benefits of
3 U.S.C. § 5. . . ," any remedy that directed further action by that
court could not be appropriate if it extended the manual recount
beyond December 12."1 Because there were equal protection
flaws in the system of counting, there was "no recount procedure
436. Bush II, 121 S. Ct. at 541 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
437. Id.
438. Id.
439. See COMMITTEE ON THE MANNER OF APPOINTMENTS OF PRESIDENTIAL ELEcTORs,
supra note 342, at 13. Congress could also rely on the same equal protection principles ar-
ticulated in the per curiam opinion, and on Harper, Reynolds, Moore, and Gray to reject
the twenty-five electoral votes from Florida.
440. Bush II, 121 S. Ct. at 532.
441. Id. at 533.
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in place... that comport[ed] with minimal constitutional stan-
dards." 2 In short, if the recount had been started anew, the sys-
tem in place would have required revision, and there was not
enough time to do so in the few remaining hours before the dead-
line imposed by 3 U.S.C. § 5 expired.
As stated previously, many experts view the Supreme Court's
order to stop counting as indefensible.' 4 This assertion, however,
is incorrect. The remand is defensible because the Florida court
itself indicated that it was required to protect the safe harbor.' 4
The court's "fatal" concessions, however, are not clearly spelled
out in any one of its three opinions. The scattered bits and pieces
are isolated and then pieced together in the following paragraphs.
First: The Florida court noted that 3 U.S.C. § 5 limits the
power of Florida's Secretary of State to ignore late returns, since
ignoring them might "preclud[e] Florida voters from participating
fully in the federal electoral process." 5 This reasoning concedes
that the discretion of the executive branch is circumscribed by 3
U.S.C. § 5. In Palm Beach County Canvassing Board v. Harris"6
(Harris II1), the court recognized that owing to 3 U.S.C. § 5, "the
time to complete a manual recount must be reasonable.""' The
court also conceded this important point with regard to an elec-
tion for "presidential electors": The conception of reasonableness
"must be circumscribed by the provisions of 3 U.S.C. § 5, which
sets December 12, 2000 as the date for the final determination of
any state's dispute concerning its electors in order for that deter-
mination to be given conclusive effect in Congress."' 8
The foregoing admission demonstrates that the court under-
stood, on December 11, that 3 U.S.C § 5 circumscribed its discre-
tion to establish time limits on the manual recounts of ballots by
canvassing boards. The court's clarification was referring to man-
ual recounts during the precertification protest phase of the liti-
442. Id.
443. See supra notes 10, 40, and accompanying text.
444. See infra notes 445-58 and accompanying text.
445. Harris I, 772 So. 2d 1220, 1237 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
446. 772 So. 2d 1273 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
447. Id. at 1286.
448. Id. at 1286 n.17.
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gation;4 9 nonetheless, it can be inferred that the discretion of the
state's judicial branch is also circumscribed during a contest. In-
deed, the court limited its own discretion during the protest
phase to make sure that the contest ended before December 12. 5 0
What other reason could it have had?
Second: The Florida court also understood that "[a] fundamen-
tal principle governing presidential election law in the United
States is set forth in article II [sic], section 1 of the United States
Constitution, which confers on state legislatures the power to
regulate the appointment of presidential electors."45' Citing
McPherson v. Blacker,452 the court recognized that this grant of
power to the state legislature operates as a limit on its own power
to circumscribe the legislature.45 It would be odd if Article II con-
strained the power of the executive branch but not the judicial
branch, particularly since the judicial branch decides whether a
candidate may contest an election.
Third: In the section entitled "Applicable Law" in Harris III
the Florida court acknowledged that (1) Congress enacted 3
U.S.C. § 5 to make sure that controversies about the appointment
of electors are settled by a date certain, and (2) Florida's legisla-
ture "enacted legislation" consistent with 3 U.S.C. § 5.454
Fourth: The Florida court also noted that the extension of the
legislature's specified certification period was set no later than
November 26 "to accommodate the outside deadline set forth in 3
U.S.C. § 5 of December 12, 2000."115 The court removed any lin-
gering doubt about its obligation to protect the safe harbor when
it stated that "because the selection and participation of Florida's
electors in the presidential election process is subject to a strin-
gent calendar controlled by federal law, the Florida election law
449. See id. at 1284-85 (discussing section 102.166(1), which provides for a "right of
protest"); id. at 1291 ("[E]lection returns must be accepted for filing unless it can clearly
be determined that the late filing would prevent an election contest or the consideration of
Florida's vote in a presidential election.").
450. Bush II, 121 S. Ct. at 536-37 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
451. Harris III, 772 So. 2d at 1281.
452. 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
453. Harris III, 772 So. 2d at 1281-82.
454. Id.
455. Id. at 1290 n.22.
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scheme must yield in the event of a conflict."456
In sum, the court's opinions in Harris II and Harris III were
based on the "view that the Legislature would not wish to endan-
ger Florida's vote not being counted in a presidential election."45
The court must have recognized that it too could endanger the
electoral vote, even though it claimed that it did not wish to do
SO.
4 5 8
Justice Stevens argued that 3 U.S.C. § 5 "did not impose any
affirmative duties upon the States."459 This argument, however, is
irrelevant. Naturally, Congress did not mandate compliance with
3 U.S.C. § 5 in a manner that would impose fines and penalties
on states that do not meet the deadline. Instead, 3 U.S.C. § 5 is
an inducement.460 The condition attached to 3 U.S.C. § 5 is simi-
lar to many federal statutes that grant privileges with conditions
attached.46' Consider, for example, a statute that gives a state
federal funds for highway construction so long as the state legis-
lature enacts laws in accordance with a speed limit specified by
Congress. In such a case, the question is not whether the state
has an affirmative duty to comply with the speed limit specified,
nor is the question whether the state is mandated to comply. The
only question is whether the state law, as construed by the state
judiciary, complies with the conditions attached to a statute
granting the conditional benefit.462
456. Harris I, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1254 n.l (Fla. 2000) (per curiam). Moreover, in its De-
cember 11 response to the first remand, the court justified overruling the Secretary's No-
vember 14 deadline by concluding that "the decision as to when amended returns can be
excluded from the statewide certification must necessarily be considered in conjunction
with the contest provisions of section 102.168 and the deadlines set forth in 3 U.S.C. § 5."
Harris III, 772 So. 2d at 1289.
457. Harris III, 772 So. 2d at 1291.
458. See id.
459. Bush II, 121 S. Ct. at 540 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
460. It would be unconstitutional for Congress to enact a law that coerced action left to
state control. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) ('The Federal Gov-
ernment may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.");
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 87 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting) ("The power to tax
and spend is not without constitutional restraints.... [Ift may not be used to coerce action
left to state control.").
461. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (addressing 23 U.S.C. § 158,
which reduced federal highway funding to states with a minimum drinking age below
twenty-one).
462. Cf. id. at 210 (stating that the "proposition that the [Federal] power [to grant a
state privileges with conditions] may not be used to induce the states to engage in activi-
ties that would themselves be unconstitutional").
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The incurable flaw in Harris 11 was the court's failure to spec-
ify any time limits to end the contest. The court's failure to take
any action to end the recount cannot be attributed solely to ab-
sent-mindedness. Instead, the court was more likely attempting
to balance "the need for prompt resolution and finality" against
what it perceived to be "the need for accuracy."463 The court, how-
ever, erred in giving too much weight to the need for accuracy.
The Supreme Court had the duty to protect the congressionally
created safe harbor immunity from the competing interest that
placed the rights of the agents (the Florida voters) above the in-
tentions of their principal (the Florida legislature).4"' The Court
made sure that the appropriate balance was struck.
III. CONCLUDING REMARKS: DEFENDING THE REMAND AGAINST
THE COURT'S HARSHEST CRITICS
The clock was ticking towards midnight on December 12, when
the Court issued its final remand in Bush 11.465 This decision
brought finality "to a badly flawed" presidential election.466 By
February 8, Bush's approval rating on a Fox News Channel
opinion poll was sixty-two percent and rising."7 Clinton's rating
was under fifty percent.468 No one polled the public for Gore's
rating.469
While, in the opinion of this author, the Court's coup de morte
was deft and daring, numerous critics disagree. For example,
Jesse Jackson compared Bush 11 to Dred Scott." Anthony Lewis
463. Harris 11, 772 So. 2d at 1261. Because fidelity to the letter and spirit of preexisting
Florida law is a requirement of federal law, the state court did not strike the right bal-
ance, and needed to be corrected. See Charles Fried, A Badly Flawed Election:' An Ex-
change, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Feb. 22, 2001, at 8-9.
464. In its enthusiasm to have every legal vote counted, the Florida Supreme Court
authorized the continuation of the manual recount beyond December 12 notwithstanding
the federal law establishing "an outside deadline." Harris II, 772 So. 2d at 1261. This rem-
edy, which the Florida court believed was appropriate for the failure of 60,000 voters to
cast their ballots properly, was not the right balance to strike.
465. See Richard L. Berke, Bush Prevails, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2000, at Al.
466. Dworkin, supra note 40, at 53.
467. Special Report with Brit Hume (FOX News television broadcast, Feb. 8, 2001).
468. Id.
469. See id.
470. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); R.W. Apple, Jr., The 43rd Presi-
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thought the decision was a self-inflicted wound that would harm
the nation.47' Some critics have viciously attacked Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Thomas and Scalia, even though many of
these newly minted Article I, Section 2 experts, it seems, never
bothered to read McPherson v. Blacker.47 2 The five Justices under
attack undoubtedly anticipated a barrage of criticism;473 however,
they did not simply take the easy way out. Since chaos was a
clear and present danger, the Justices had the fortitude to end
Gore's Sisyphian effort.
Aside from the fact that Justice Breyer's proposal to extend the
deadline was not in accordance with state law,474 it also would
have served no useful purpose. 7" Justice Breyer's proposal would
have simply resulted in a new slate of electors being appointed by
the Florida legislature.476 That dramatic move, in turn, would
dent: News Analysis; Now, Lifting the Clouds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2000, at Al.
471. See Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; Raising the Stakes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11,
2000, at A31.
472. 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
473. Supreme Court Justices obviously are aware that in the United States debates
surrounding controversial public issues "may well include vehement, caustic, and some-
time unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and government officials." New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
474. See supra Part II.B.-C.
475. Charles Fried, counsel for the State legislature, has written that, if the Florida
Supreme Court devised a standard on December 13, a recount based on a revised standard
compatible with the Equal Protection Clause could not have been completed on December
18, especially since the overvotes would have to be counted. Fried, supra note 463, at 8
"That is because [the] recount would go forward under the contest provisions of Florida
law, and those envisage not a simple tally, but a full-blown legal process, complete with
briefing, oral argument, and a full recourse to appellate process. Such contests in Florida
have been known to require sixteen months." Id. Fried goes on to say that after "further
arguments in the Florida Supreme Court, on remand, followed by an opinion from that
court--which may have occasioned further review of the Supreme Court of the United
States [only] then would the recount have [commenced] and there would be still more pro-
cess about that." Id. Fried asks, "Would such a continuation of the legal proceedings, in-
evitably leading to an indeterminate outcome [that is, another statistical tie], really have
been a satisfactory course? Surely, if that was the alternative, the Court did well to shut
the thing down then and there [on December 12]." Id.
476. The apparent confidence that the dissenting Justices had in the ability of the
State of Florida and Congress to cope with any problems caused by the loss of the safe
harbor is not consistent with scenarios projected by the Florida legislature. On November
30, 2000, the Select Joint Committee on the Manner of Appointment of Presidential Elec-
tors adopted the following motion proposed by Senator John Laurent:
It is clear from the expert testimony presented to this Committee that the
Legislature has the fundamental obligation under Article II of the United
States Constitution to ensure that Florida's electors are counted on January 6
when Congress counts the votes of the Electoral College. Based on the entire
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have energized Gore supporters to seek injunctive relief. If the
Florida Supreme Court had granted that relief and then enjoined
the certification of the legislative slate, how would Congress have
voted when it examined the electoral returns from Florida? How
would Governor Jeb Bush have reacted to the injunction? One op-
tion that was being seriously considered was to seek relief from
the federal courts, if either the Governor or other members of the
executive branch were enjoined by the Florida court.4" Under
these circumstances, had the Court not ended this flawed election
when it did, a new millennium version of the 1877 Hayes-Tilden
fiasco was highly probable.
Apparently Justice Breyer was willing to react to these events
if and when they occurred; however, the Court took a proactive
approach, seemingly realizing that any hesitation on its part
would have interfered with the orderly transition of administra-
tions on January 20.4"8 As this article goes to press, it seems clear
testimony presented to this Committee, there appears to be a significant risk
that all of Florida's voters may be disenfranchised if the Legislature does not
act to fulfill its responsibility. If the election controversies and contests now
pending are not finally and conclusively determined by December 12, there
can be no assurance that Congress will count the votes of Florida's 25 elec-
tors. From the testimony presented, it appears likely that the determination
necessary to ensure Congress counts the votes will not occur by December 12
and that, even if made, such determination may not be conclusive because of
postelection changes in the election laws.
I, therefore, move that this committee recommend to the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives that the Legislature
convene in special session to determine the manner in which the electors of
this state shall be appointed and to consider, and if necessary, take such
other action to ensure that Florida's 25 electoral votes for President and Vice
President in the 2000 Presidential Election are counted.
COMMITTEE ON THE MANNER OF APPOINTMENTS OF PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORS, supra note
342, at 9-10.
477. A staff member of the speaker of the Florida House of Representatives stated that
members of the executive branch were prepared to resist any order from the Florida court
concerning the appointment of electors. E-mail from Donald Rubottom, Aide & Legal Ad-
visor to Tom Feeney, Speaker of the Florida House of Representatives, to Gary C. Leedes,
Professor of Law, Emeritus, University of Richmond School of Law (Feb. 7, 2001, 15:34
EST) (on file with author). This concern was based on a widespread distrust of the Florida
Supreme Court. I asked him whether there was any real concern that the supreme court
would try to enjoin the Governor. He replied: "Very much so." Id. Staff members were get-
ting ready to prepare briefs and memos for a floor fight in Congress, if and when objec-
tions were made during the joint session on January 6 to electors appointed by the legisla-
ture. Id. What was occurring in Florida was a bare-knuckled power struggle; thus, what
was needed was a final arbiter who would put an end to the struggle. The Supreme Court,
exercising its power to decide federal questions in cases and controversies, did just that.
478. Cf. Bush II, 121 S. Ct. 525, 538-39 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("[Tihe
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that the Court acted appropriately. President Bush's inaugura-
tion and the first several months of his presidency have gone
smoothly. Moreover, despite its critics, the Court also has re-
ceived the public support it needed. 9 At a time when respect for
every other government institution is declining, the country still
looks to the Supreme Court for authority and finality."0
The underlying theme of this article has been that five risk-
averse Justices exposed themselves to severe criticism and unfair
ridicule in order to avoid likely perils to our system of govern-
ment."' As the first months of the Bush presidency demonstrate,
the decision made by these five Justices was wise and prudent.4 2
Nonetheless, one must still ask: did the Court have the authority
to stop the presidential election in its tracks before the "train-
wreck?"' Election challenges frequently present the question of
whether an election should be halted when votes are not being
weighted equally. A federal court deciding whether to grant vot-
ers "immediately effective relief' must make its decision guided
by equitable principles.' In short, there was no real binding
precedent that compelled the Supreme Court to end or allow re-
sumption of the recount. The applicable law was open textured
and the Court adopted a pragmatic approach in order to achieve a
forward looking and useful result."85 Neither the Constitution nor
the federal statutes yield a single correct answer with regard to
the Court's final remand. Bush H was a unique and difficult case
that had to be considered in light of its peculiar facts and circum-
federal deadlines for the Presidential election simply do not permit even such a shortened
[counting] process.").
479. See Krauthammer, supra note 39, at 104.
480. Id.
481. Justice Stevens concludes his dissent with a not-so-subtle attack on the majority,
claiming that they collectively failed to act "as an impartial guardian of the rule of law."
Bush II, 121 S. Ct. at 542 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He wrote that "[t]ime will one day heal
the wound... that will be inflicted by today's decision." Id. Justice Breyer also wanted the
majority to avoid "the risk of undermining the public's confidence in the Court itself." Id.
at 557 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
482. In the long run, the Court's decision will have a salutary effect if election laws in
our country are changed to forestall another traumatic hurricane like the one that tore
through Florida during the five absurd weeks of suspense, drama, and farce.
483. Filkins & Canedy, supra note 32, at A17 (quoting Bruce Ackerman's use of this
descriptive term).
484. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 585 (1964).
485. Cf. POSNER, supra note 42, at 4-5, 11.
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stances." 6 This assessment involves the exercise of sound judicial
discretion.8 7
The election-ending remand in Bush II was clearly within the
discretion of the Supreme Court: (1) Given the variable methods
of discerning a voter's intent put in place by the Florida Supreme
Court after the election; (2) the other extraordinary circum-
stances that flawed the presidential election in Florida and re-
sulted in a statistical tie unbreakable under any recount; (3) the
imminent and irreparable harm that would have flown from con-
tinuation of the contest until an uncertain, future date; (4) the
conclusion that the Florida Supreme Court understood that the
state legislature wanted to take advantage of the safe harbor; (5)
and the imminent and certain expiration of the safe harbor dead-
line.
486. See Bush II, 121 S. Ct. at 533 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("We deal here not
with an ordinary election, but with an election for the President of the United States."). In
the future, lawyers will argue that Rehnquist's opinion limits the scope of Bush II to
presidential elections. It seems likely that Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and
Thomas would not want Bush II to open up the floodgates for litigation that challenges
every instance of disparate treatment of voters in elections conducted under state law.
487. The Chief Justice had previously explained that discretion is required in some
voting rights cases and that there "is no substitute for the hard judgments that must be
made." Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 359 (quoting Storer v.
Brown, 415 U.S. 725, 730 (1974)).
